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Responding to Rawls: Toward a Consistent  
and Supportable Theory of Distributive Justice 
 
David Elkins* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Distributive justice is concerned with the question of how benefits 
and burdens, and in particular how economic resources, should be 
allocated. Contemporary discussions of distributive justice are dominated 
by Rawlsian methodology, which proceeds from the presumption that 
talents and social position are undeserved and cannot support claims of 
entitlement. While the distribution of such attributes is itself neither just 
nor unjust, the justice inherent in a society is measured by the extent to 
which it is willing to neutralize such morally arbitrary factors in 
determining the distribution of economic resources. Nevertheless, as 
material incentives are ordinarily required in order to encourage 
productive economic activity, a balance must be struck between the 
demands of equality and those of efficiency. The question is where to 
strike that balance.1
John Rawls argued that positions that people take with regard to 
questions of distributive justice may be influenced by their knowledge of 
how they themselves would fare under various structures. He therefore 
proposed investigating what principles would be adopted by individuals 
unaware of their own talents or social status—what he referred to as the 
“original position”—so that they would not be able accurately to predict 
how any particular structure would affect them.2 Behind this “veil of 
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Visiting Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law. Ph.D. Bar Ilan University, 1999; LL.M. 
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by a grant from the SMU Dedman School of Law. For their helpful comments, I would like to thank 
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mother Miriam for reviewing earlier drafts. Any errors that remain are, of course, my own 
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 1. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 67–72 (1971). The impact of Rawls’s work on 
political theory in general, and distributive justice in particular, cannot be overstated. “A Theory of 
Justice is a powerful, deep, subtle, wide-ranging, systematic work in political and moral philosophy 
which has not seen its like since the writings of John Stuart Mill, if then. . . . Even those who remain 
unconvinced after wrestling with Rawls’ systematic vision will learn much from closely studying it.” 
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 183 (1974). 
 2. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 18–19. 
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ignorance,” Rawls claimed, risk aversion would overcome all other 
considerations: one would not risk the little he might have in order to 
increase what he would receive were he one of the wealthy.3 The result 
would, therefore, be the adoption of principles maximizing the welfare 
level of the least well-off (“the difference principle”).4
The difference principle is not, however, the only possible outcome 
of Rawlsian methodology. In particular, the degree of risk aversion that 
the participants would display might arguably range anywhere from the 
extreme of zero, in which case participants would presumably adopt 
welfare-maximizing principles conforming with classic utilitarianism, to 
the overwhelming role that Rawls assumed it would play.5 The greater 
the risk aversion, the less willing the participants would be to sacrifice 
equality for greater total welfare.6
The evident truth of the proposition that individuals do not deserve, 
in a moral sense, the attributes which determine their distributive shares 
of social goods7 and the apparently inexorable reasoning from that point 
forward seem to indicate that, while the difference principle itself might 
be disputable, some type of Rawlsian redistribution is morally required. 
In fact, the Rawlsian methodology is so powerful that, as Nozick himself 
claimed, today’s political philosophers must “either work within Rawls’s 
 3. Id. at 152–53. 
 4. Id. at 75–78. Drawing on the terminology of game theory, Rawls described the difference 
principle as the “maximin solution to the problem of social justice.” Id. at 152. 
 5. Benjamin R. Barber, Justifying Justice: Problems of Psychology, Politics and 
Measurement in Rawls, in READING RAWLS: CRITICAL STUDIES OF A THEORY OF JUSTICE 292, 297–
98 (Norman Daniels ed., 1975); see also NICHOLAS RESCHER, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: A 
CONSTRUCTIVE CRITIQUE OF THE UTILITARIAN THEORY OF DISTRIBUTION 25–38 (1966) (discussing 
relationship between maximizing total welfare and distribution of welfare). Interestingly, Rawls 
assumed that one of the things that individuals in the original position would be unaware of would 
be their aversion to risk. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 137. It might also be noted that individuals in the 
real world are, in fact, willing to take risks. A person who chooses, for instance, a risky career path, 
indicates by her behavior that the possibility of great reward should she be successful is sufficient to 
offset the chance that she will end up with a lesser share of social goods than a safer career path 
promises. Although she knows, as does an individual in the original position, that she has but one 
life to live, she nevertheless is willing to risk being less well-off than otherwise if the chances of 
being better-off are sufficiently attractive. 
 6. See Menahem E. Yaari, A Controversial Proposal Concerning Inequality Measurement, 
44 J. ECON. THEORY 381, 382 (1988) (presenting “equality-mindedness” in the real world as 
conceptually equivalent to risk aversion behind the veil of ignorance). 
  Throughout this Article, any principle of distributive justice that can be derived from 
Rawlsian methodology will be referred to as “Rawlsian,” whether or not it conforms to the 
difference principle. Any redistribution necessary to advance a Rawlsian conception of distributive 
justice will be referred to as a “Rawlsian redistribution.” 
 7. This truth is so evident that even Robert Nozick, libertarianism’s prime spokesman and 
Rawls’s ideological arch opponent, was forced to accept it. NOZICK, supra note 1, at 225 
(“[C]orrectly, we describe people as entitled to their natural assets even if it’s not the case that they 
can be said to deserve them.”). 
  
267] A THEORY OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 269 
 
theory or explain why not.”8 Therefore, in conformity with Nozick’s 
dictate, I will first explain why I find Rawls’s theory unacceptable. 
Rawlsian methodology, if applied consistently, appears to require a 
redistribution of economic resources, not only among members of a 
given society, but also internationally. Nationality, after all, is no less 
arbitrary than other attributes, yet it plays a significant role in 
determining an individual’s life chances. Therefore, Rawlsianism would 
seem to imply cosmopolitanism, or the application of Rawlsian 
principles of justice without regard to national boundaries. Nevertheless, 
most social philosophers, including Rawls himself, reject 
cosmopolitanism and hold that Rawlsian principles are only applicable 
to, or can be limited to, the citizens or residents of a given society.9 It 
should be noted that Rawls was willing to concede that wealthy societies 
do have a minimal obligation toward societies whose level of material 
wealth is insufficient to allow them to become “well ordered.”10 He 
rejected, however, any notion of international redistribution that was 
more comprehensive.11
A number of arguments have been raised by proponents of what I 
shall refer to as “domestic Rawlsianism” to explain why Rawlsian 
principles are inapplicable internationally.12 Nevertheless, if these 
arguments fail, and if one is unwilling to embrace the concept of a global 
Rawlsian redistribution, then one would be left with no alternative but to 
reject Rawlsianism itself. In other words, the dismissal, on intuitive 
grounds, of cosmopolitanism requires a similar dismissal of 
Rawlsianism. 
Nevertheless, rejecting Rawlsianism does not necessarily imply 
retreating into libertarianism.13 Libertarians avoid the conflict between 
 8. Id. at 183. 
 9. MARGARET CANOVAN, NATIONHOOD AND POLITICAL THEORY 28–29 (1996); JOHN 
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 11–12 (1993); JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 115–20 (1999) 
[hereinafter RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES]; YAEL TAMIR, LIBERAL NATIONALISM 121 (1993); MICHAEL 
WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 31 (1983); Michael 
Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, in COMMUNITARIANISM AND 
INDIVIDUALISM 12, 22–24 (Shlomo Avineri & Avner De-Shalit eds., 1992). 
 10. RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 9, at 106 (“Burdened societies . . . lack the political 
and cultural traditions, the human capital and know-how, and, often, the material and technological 
resources needed to be well-ordered. The long-term goal of (relatively) well-ordered societies should 
be to bring burdened societies . . . into the Society of well-ordered Peoples.”). Assisting burdened 
societies to become well-ordered involves emphasizing human rights and teaching them to manage 
their own affairs. Id. at 106–12. In some cases, although not in all, wealth transfer may be necessary. 
Id. at 108–09. 
 11. Id. at 119–20. 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. While accepting that attributes such as talents and social position are ultimately 
undeserved, see e.g, NOZICK, supra note 1, at 225, libertarians nevertheless argue that individuals 
are entitled to whatever they receive in market exchanges or as gifts. Redistribution is inappropriate, 
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domestic justice and international justice by denying that justice 
demands redistribution, even domestically. However, this approach does 
not conform to what many would deem to be our considered 
judgments.14 There is something not quite right with a world in which 
some individuals literally have more than they know what to do with, 
while others, no less deserving, lack basic sustenance. Libertarianism, I 
believe, fails to take into account most people’s fundamental belief that 
vast discrepancies in material wealth cannot be completely ignored, 
especially when it is conceded that the rich do not have any desert-based 
claim to their holdings. 
For a theory of justice to be acceptable, it needs to be both internally 
consistent and in conformance with our considered judgments.15 I believe 
that domestic Rawlsianism fails on the first count and that 
cosmopolitanism and libertarianism fail on the second. Thus, in addition 
to being internally consistent, an acceptable theory would have to occupy 
the ideological middle ground between cosmopolitanism and 
libertarianism.16
If limiting the application of distributive justice to the domestic arena 
proves impossible, the only other approach appears to be to argue for a 
conception of justice that is more limited in intensity yet more extensive 
they claim, because there never was a distribution in the first place. An individual’s holdings are 
achieved though a myriad of exchanges and transfers over which no one person or institution has any 
overriding control. FRIEDRICH AUGUST VON HAYEK, ‘Social’ or Distributive Justice, in THE 
ESSENCE OF HAYEK 63, 68–70 (Chiaki Nishiyama & Kurt R. Leube eds., 1984); see also NOZICK, 
supra note 1, at 149–50. 
 14. “Considered judgments” is a phrase coined by Rawls and defined by him as “those 
judgments in which our moral capacities are most likely to be displayed without distortion. . . . For 
example, we can discard those judgments made with hesitation, or in which we have little 
confidence[,] . . . those given when we are upset or frightened, or when we stand to gain one way or 
the other . . . .” RAWLS, supra note 1, at 47. Nevertheless, the source of our considered judgments—
even those we retain after taking the proverbial deep breath and neutralizing whatever personal 
interest we may have—presents a serious problem in discussions of distributive justice. Our most 
powerful and unshakable basic attitudes are molded by historical and sociological forces of which 
we are ordinarily unaware. See JEREMY RIFKIN, ENTROPY: A NEW WORLD VIEW 5–6 (1980). 
Building philosophical castles on clouds of considered judgments may, therefore, merely serve to 
perpetuate accepted prejudices. 
 15. Rawls implicitly assumes that the considered judgments of all reasonable people would 
be similar. Without necessarily relying on such a premise, the arguments presented in this Article 
will assume that certain basic conceptions of right and wrong are common to most people. It may be 
conceded that those who do not will not find the arguments presented here compelling. 
 16. What Rawls refers to as “the liberal conception,” the position that environmentally 
arbitrary factors should be neutralized and that distribution should accord to natural talents, occupies 
the appropriate middle ground. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 73. Nevertheless, liberalism fares no better 
than Rawlsianism in its attempt to avoid inconsistency. The first problem with liberalism, as pointed 
out by Rawls, is that natural talents are no more arbitrary than environmental factors and are no more 
deserved from a moral point of view. Id. at 75. The second problem is that national affiliation would 
appear to be one of those environmentally arbitrary factors which need to be neutralized. Liberalism, 
like Rawlsianism, would thus imply cosmopolitanism. 
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geographically. One may posit that justice is satisfied by something less 
than a Rawlsian redistribution, but that the demands of justice—limited 
as they are—are universal. Nevertheless, while the demands of justice 
are universal, a state, in regulating its internal affairs, might go beyond 
the demands of distributive justice and effect a more extensive 
redistribution, provided certain conditions are met. The theory of justice 
proposed in this Article is such an approach: a model of distributive 
justice that focuses on needs and their fulfillment and on redistribution 
beyond the dictates of distributive justice. 
Part II of the Article explores the relationship between Rawlsianism 
and cosmopolitanism. It shows how Rawlsianism logically leads into 
cosmopolitanism and examines the various arguments which have been 
raised to avoid this result. The analysis will show that the arguments are 
ultimately unsuccessful and that domestic Rawlsianism must be rejected 
as internally inconsistent. This Part further argues that unless one is 
willing to embrace cosmopolitanism, one must reject Rawls’s position 
that human society is under a positive moral obligation to neutralize the 
admitted unfairness inherent in nature. 
As an alternative to Rawlsianism, Part III introduces a needs-based 
model of distributive justice. Although admitting that the natural 
distribution is unfair, this model does not view the inequality itself as 
imposing any moral duty on those who have more to share the wealth 
with those who have less. Rather it argues that where a person is in need 
and another person or group of persons is capable of satisfying that need 
at a non-prohibitive cost, there is a moral obligation to do so. This Part 
also discusses some of the differences between inequality-based justice 
and needs-based justice and attempts to show why the consequences of 
needs-based justice conform better to our considered judgments. 
Part IV considers the implications of needs-based justice for 
domestic redistribution. Whatever duties are imposed by the terms of 
distributive justice must be applicable globally: needs-based justice 
requires that both the needs of compatriots and the needs of foreigners be 
addressed. It would seem to follow that, having satisfied those needs—
or, more accurately, having gone as far in acting to satisfy needs as the 
terms of justice require—distributive justice can impose no further 
obligation to enact a more comprehensive domestic redistribution. If 
distributive justice requires a more comprehensive redistribution, then it 
is unclear why foreigners should not be entitled to benefit from it. If, on 
the other hand, distributive justice does not demand more than needs 
satisfaction, it is unclear how a more extensive domestic redistribution 
can be justified. Part IV addresses this issue and—in what is a mirror 
image of the analysis of Part II—examines possible arguments for a 
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more extensive domestic redistribution. The conclusion reached in Part 
IV is that distributive justice is incapable of imposing different 
obligations in the domestic and international arenas. This Part next 
examines whether it is possible to justify a more comprehensive 
domestic redistribution on a form of transactional justice embodied in 
benefit theory. Classic attempts to do so, which rely on the supposed 
greater benefit derived by the wealthy from government, are 
unconvincing. Part IV, however, argues that concern for the fate of 
compatriots, while insufficient either to limit or to expand the obligations 
of distributive justice, can justify the imposition of taxation for the 
purpose of improving the welfare of the less well-off beyond merely 
satisfying their needs. Finally, this Part considers some implications of 
the proposed model. 
 
II.  RAWLS AND COSMOPOLITANISM 
 
If morally arbitrary factors are truly improper criteria on which to 
stake distributive claims, justice would appear to require an international 
Rawlsian redistribution. Ostensibly, an individual’s nationality would 
appear to be as arbitrary an attribute as that individual’s race, gender, 
social position, or natural talents. Each of these attributes is part of the 
“natural lottery,” the results of which should, according to Rawls, be 
neutralized as far as possible when determining distributive shares.17 
There would, therefore, be no reason to halt the redistributive process at 
national borders. Redistributing wealth among those who happen to be 
citizens or residents of a certain country and ignoring the claims of those 
located beyond its borders, merely on the basis of their inherited status as 
outsiders, would appear to be as morally arbitrary as redistributing 
wealth only among those of a certain racial or ethnic background, or only 
among members of a given social class and ignoring the claim of those 
not so classified.18
Reasonable individuals behind the veil of ignorance who were 
unaware of their national affiliation would not agree to allow their life 
chances to be determined by such affiliation any more than they would 
allow them to be determined by their natural talents. It is therefore 
surprising to discover that many social philosophers who adopt a 
Rawlsian conception of justice hold that the requirement to redistribute 
wealth is fully applicable only within the borders of a state and that the 
 17. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 74. 
 18. See Loren Lomasky, Toward a Liberal Theory of Natural Boundaries, in BOUNDARIES 
AND JUSTICE: DIVERSE ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 55, 56–60 (David Miller & Sohail H. Hashmi eds., 
2001). 
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claims of outsiders to participate in the redistribution may be justifiably 
ignored or, at the least, that a lesser level of redistribution is required to 
satisfy their claims.19 This, in fact, was the position taken by Rawls 
himself. The only obligations of international distributive justice that 
Rawls recognized were those of richer states, vis-à-vis poorer states, to 
guarantee that the latter are able to reach the level of material prosperity 
necessary to sustain a well-ordered society.20 Beyond that minimum 
level, Rawls argued that there is no moral obligation to redistribute 
wealth, even if an alternative distribution of the world’s economic 
resources would be more advantageous to the world’s worst-off persons 
or group of persons.21
The question which needs to be addressed is whether domestic 
Rawlsianism is a viable position or whether it suffers from a fatal 
internal inconsistency, deriving from the fact that the fundamental 
principle underlying Rawlsianism—that morally arbitrary attributes 
cannot ground entitlement—seems to lead inexorably toward 
cosmopolitanism. Saving domestic Rawlsianism from inconsistency, 
however, cannot be achieved by adjusting or “fine tuning” the 
fundamental Rawlsian principle so as to avoid cosmopolitanism unless 
the rephrased principle itself conforms to our considered judgments. For 
example, one may rephrase Rawls’s fundamental principle in the 
following manner: the effects of morally arbitrary factors that impact an 
individual’s welfare should be neutralized as far as possible, with the 
single exception of national affiliation, which, although just as arbitrary 
from a moral point of view, may legitimately determine what an 
individual is able to achieve in his or her life. This rephrased principle 
avoids cosmopolitanism, but at the cost of creating a conflict with our 
considered judgments. Why should humanity not attempt to neutralize, 
as far as possible, the effects of a person’s national affiliation, when 
national affiliation is just as arbitrary, from a moral point of view, as are 
other factors whose effects Rawls argues should be neutralized? 
 19. See infra Part II.A–D. Some political philosophers who advocate extensive redistribution 
simply ignore, explicitly or implicitly, the possible international ramifications of the positions they 
espouse. See JOHN CHRISTMAN, THE MYTH OF PROPERTY: TOWARD AN EGALITARIAN THEORY OF 
OWNERSHIP 170–74 (1994) (discussing what a just state must provide its citizens with no mention of 
the international arena); LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND 
JUSTICE 41 (2002) (arguing that the framework for discussion of tax policy is the state and explicitly 
ignoring questions of global justice and international taxation); ERIC RAKOWSKI, EQUAL JUSTICE 19 
(1991) (discussing different notions of how a just state treats its citizens while ignoring international 
ramifications); see also JEREMY WALDRON, John Rawls and the Social Minimum, in LIBERAL 
RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981–1991, at 250–51 (1993) (discussing people’s entitlement to an 
equal share of social wealth or to a minimum provision without considering the position of those 
people who are not members of the society). 
 20. RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 9, at 106. 
 21. Id. at 119–20. 
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Is it possible to restrict the application of principles of distributive 
justice to the internal affairs of a state and to ignore claims of foreigners 
who would like to participate in the redistribution? Non-cosmopolitan 
commentators who wrestle with the problem of the internationalization 
of justice have raised a number of arguments in their attempts to justify 
domestic Rawlsianism. The major justification attempts may be referred 
to as the benefit apportionment argument, the national association 
argument, the original position argument, and the functionality and 
practicality argument. 
 
A.  Benefit Apportionment Argument 
 
Rawls introduced his analysis of justice as fairness by pointing out 
that human society is both cooperative and competitive. Through 
cooperation, people can collectively achieve a higher level of welfare 
than through individual effort. Nevertheless, he stated, although social 
cooperation is marked by an identity of interests, the interests of 
individuals conflict when it comes to distributing the benefits of that 
cooperation. As the benefit of social cooperation is finite, each 
individual’s interest in taking for himself as much of that benefit as 
possible is incompatible with the interests of others. Justice, Rawls 
claimed, involves the fair distribution of this benefit, and his theory of 
justice as fairness was his attempt to describe how society should go 
about distributing the benefits of social cooperation.22
From Rawls’s perspective, social cooperation appears to be both a 
necessary and a sufficient condition for social justice. Where social 
cooperation is lacking, the concept of justice is meaningless. Justice has 
meaning only within the framework of a cooperative society.23
However, this line of reasoning would imply that in a state of nature, 
individuals would be entitled to whatever level of welfare they were able 
to achieve and that no one would have any legitimate claims to the 
wealth produced by others. Thus Rawls, according to the benefit 
apportionment argument, accepts the Lockean perspective that, in such a 
state, each individual has exclusive rights in his or her own labor and in 
the product of that labor.24 This in turn implies that each individual has 
 22. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 4. 
 23. “I concede that a criterion of justice for domestic institutions would be sufficient if 
modern states were indeed closed schemes. In this case there simply would not be a global basic 
structure for principles of global justice to apply to.” THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS 240 
(1989); see also CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 136–69 
(1979). 
 24. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §27, at 287–88 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). 
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the exclusive right to benefit from his or her own talents. On the other 
hand, the difference principle is premised on the assumption that 
individuals are not morally entitled to benefit from the talents they 
happen to possess by virtue of the “natural lottery.”25 Thus the contention 
that justice is applicable in a state of nature would appear to undermine 
the entire logical structure upon which the difference principle is based. 
Furthermore, natural talents by themselves are insufficient to 
produce the necessities of life. A person, no matter how talented, cannot 
produce food, clothing, or shelter without integrating a physical 
component. Locke, therefore, argued that when a person combines his 
labor with a part of the physical world, the rights of exclusive ownership 
that the person had in his or her labor flows into the physical component, 
and the person acquires exclusive rights to the product. According to 
Locke, the labor necessary to ground a claim of ownership in a part of 
the physical world can range from gathering nuts in the forest to 
cultivating a plot of land.26
This rationale for exclusive ownership does not flow directly from 
the first contention regarding the rights of each individual to his 
endowment. One might accept the latter and yet argue that because the 
product contains elements of both privately owned labor and the 
commonly owned physical world, rights in the product should be 
apportioned accordingly. The rest of humanity would therefore have a 
claim to a proportionate part of the product.27
Nevertheless, the benefit apportionment argument appears to indicate 
that Rawls accepts even this more controversial contention, based on the 
benefit apportionment argument: as combining one’s labor with the 
physical world is not an act of social cooperation, no one can 
legitimately raise any claim based on justice to share in the wealth 
created. In fact, Rawls’s position may be even more deferential to the 
natural right of ownership than was Locke’s. While allowing a person to 
combine his labor with that of the natural world and claim exclusive 
ownership in the product, Locke was careful to add the proviso that the 
laborer leave for others “as much and as good” as he took for himself.28 
Where resources are limited and the appropriation by one would 
negatively impact the ability of others to act similarly, the Lockean 
proviso would act to deny the laborer’s claim to exclusive rights in the 
product. Locke, therefore, limited the right to expropriate scarce natural 
resources for private use. 
 25. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 73–74. 
 26. LOCKE, supra note 24, §28, at 288, §32, at 290–91. 
 27. NOZICK, supra note 1, at 174–75. 
 28. LOCKE, supra note 24, §27, at 288. 
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On the other hand, Rawls is considerably less restrictive with regard 
to the expropriation for exclusive use of part of the natural world. When 
considering the international arena, Rawls avers that each state has 
exclusive rights to the natural resources in its territory and is not required 
to share with other nations the wealth derived from its exploitation of 
those natural resources.29 Rawls does not require that a state must leave 
for other states “as much and as good” as it took for itself. A state, 
according to Rawls, may legitimately claim exclusive rights to extremely 
scarce, and consequently valuable, resources.30
Introducing social cooperation changes Rawls’s position 
dramatically. From advocating a position that is perhaps even more 
deferential to the possibility of acquiring private property than that of 
Locke, Rawls argues that wealth should be drastically redistributed in 
accordance with the difference principle where there is social 
cooperation involved. The following hypothetical examines whether 
these two positions are, in fact, compatible. 
Consider the case of two shipwrecked sailors, Mary and Paul, on a 
deserted island. For whatever reason, they go their separate ways, and 
each one fends for himself or herself. Assume that Mary turns out to be 
an excellent hunter-gatherer. She enjoys lavish meals and comfortable 
clothing; she is even able to stash away extra food and other resources 
for the proverbial rainy day. Paul, on the other hand, is a mediocre 
hunter-gatherer. He is unable to acquire much more than what he needs 
for bare subsistence and is therefore unable to accumulate anything for 
the future. According to Rawls, Mary is under no moral obligation to 
share her wealth with Paul. Each is operating completely independent of 
the other, and in the absence of social cooperation, there are no operative 
rules of distributive justice.31
 29. RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 9, at 116–17. 
 30. Note also that, according to Rawls, the mere presence of natural resources in the state’s 
territory is sufficient to ground claims of ownership to those resources, even before the state exerts 
any effort to add value to those resources by combining them with its labor. Thus, while Locke held 
that ownership results from the combination of labor with part of the natural world, Rawls’s position 
apparently was that a state may claim rights to resources in its territory, without having added an iota 
of economic value. Id. at 117 (“[T]he arbitrariness of the distribution of natural resources causes no 
difficulty.”) 
  The acquisition of territory by a state is analogous to the acquisition of territory or other 
natural resources by an individual or group of individuals in a state of nature. A state may be viewed 
in this context as a group of individuals operating in a state of nature vis-à-vis other states and 
acquiring territory either through first possession or by conquest. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 
244 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1651) (“[T]he law of nations, and the law of nature, is the same 
thing.”). Interestingly, Rawls, when discussing the rights of a state to natural resources in its 
territory, does not consider how it came to possess the territory in question. 
 31. Rawls, it might be added, would apparently release Mary from any moral obligation to 
share her good fortune with Paul even if it turned out that Mary’s success resulted simply from her 
half of the island being easier to hunt and gather in. RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 9,            
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Mary and Paul now consider the possibility of joining forces. A day 
or two of experimentation convinces them that together they can hunt 
and gather more effectively than they can separately; their joint take is 
greater than their separate takes combined. It would, therefore, be 
rational for them to continue their cooperation. As Rawls points out, 
however, while the two of them have a mutual interest in cooperating, 
their interests diverge when it comes to distributing the benefits of that 
cooperation.32 Being rational, they will most likely bargain for the 
surplus wealth attributable to the cooperation. As the cooperation of each 
is a necessary condition for obtaining the surplus wealth, and each is 
equally capable of refusing to cooperate, they might end up splitting the 
surplus evenly between them, so that each would be entitled to what he 
or she would have acquired by working on his or her own plus half of the 
remainder. Alternatively, Paul may recognize Mary’s superior skills and 
agree that the surplus be divided proportionally; if, for example, Mary’s 
average take in the absence of cooperation was three times that of Paul’s, 
then Mary might get three-quarters of the cooperative take. 
Of course, the situation might be different if Mary and Paul were to 
marry, and especially if they were to raise a family together. In those 
circumstances, it would no longer be necessary to negotiate the price of 
social cooperation if, due to mutual affection and shared interest in the 
fate of their children, each of them has as his or her goal the welfare of 
the family unit. The couple might very well adopt Rawlsian principles in 
distributing their resources. Not only would the benefit of cooperation be 
shared, but so would each person’s original endowment. 
However, where Mary and Paul are independent actors negotiating 
for economic cooperation, it would not be reasonable to demand that 
Mary allow Paul to keep the entire surplus to compensate him for his 
relatively poor hunting and gathering skills. Doing so might be 
commendable on Mary’s part, but it is unclear why justice would 
demand such action. In the same way, Mary might be commended for 
coming to Paul’s aid before the commencement of cooperation between 
them, and yet Rawls would have imposed upon her no moral duty to do 
so. 
Nevertheless, once Paul and Mary begin cooperating in the 
production of wealth, Rawls goes even further than vesting in Paul the 
right to the entire surplus wealth. As the worst off individual in the 
society, Paul would apparently have a claim to half of the entire take and, 
moreover, to half of the wealth stashed away in Mary’s cave.33 In such a 
at 116–17. 
 32. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 4. 
 33. Rawls would only allow Mary a greater share of the take if doing so were necessary in 
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situation the various arguments raised by Rawls to justify the difference 
principle would come into play. Mary does not deserve her exceptional 
skill in any morally meaningful way. She does not have any claim of 
moral desert to the wealth attributable to her natural talent. In Rawls’s 
original position, Mary and Paul would not have agreed to allow the 
wealth to accrue to the one who happened to be in possession of the 
necessary skills. 
But is the quantum leap from the justice-free realm of individual 
action to the difference principle-dominated realm of social cooperation 
justified? Mary’s entitlement, in a state of nature, to whatever material 
level of well-being her natural talents allow her to achieve implies 
exclusive rights in the natural talents she happens to possess. These 
rights would, presumably, include the right to sell or trade the use of 
those talents and to retain for her exclusive use whatever she received in 
exchange. 
From the perspective of justice as fairness, as subsequently 
developed by Rawls, the problem with denying the applicability of 
justice in a state of nature is that even in the absence of social 
cooperation, the welfare level that an individual is able to achieve is the 
result of factors that, in Rawlsian terminology, are arbitrary from a moral 
point of view.34 As Rawls so strongly argues, the unequal distribution of 
talents is a fact. It is neither just nor unjust. What is just or unjust is the 
extent to which it is allowed to influence the distribution of primary 
social goods.35 If it is assumed that a person deserves his natural talents, 
then the possession of those talents might ground an entitlement claim to 
the wealth which those talents produced. However, if, as Rawls claims, a 
person does not deserve her natural talents, it would not appear that she 
has any moral claim to the material wealth that those talents are able to 
produce, whether she exploited those talents within the framework of 
social cooperation or in a state of nature.36 In other words, if a person has 
exclusive rights to her talents and to the wealth which they produce, she 
should be entitled to whatever she receives in exchange for exploiting 
them. If, on the other hand, she does not have exclusive rights to her 
order to induce her to continue hunting and gathering for Paul’s benefit. 
 34. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 72. 
 35. Id. at 102. 
 36. Of course, a state of nature would, by definition, lack any mechanism by which to 
enforce redistributive claims. This, however, does not detract from the legitimacy of those claims. 
Indeed one of the main problems with a state of nature is the lack of enforceability of any natural 
right. Thus, natural right theory maintains, individuals establish governments in order to enforce 
their natural rights of life, liberty and property. If, as posited, their property rights include a portion 
of the wealth produced through the talents of others, governments would be charged with enforcing 
those rights too. 
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natural talents, then it is unclear why she should have exclusive rights to 
what they enable her to produce in the absence of social cooperation. 
The same principles that were in play with regard to Mary and Paul 
apply in a more sophisticated market setting as well. Individuals 
negotiate for cooperation in their joint ventures. Those who own factors 
of production—such as laborers, lenders, property owners, and 
entrepreneurs—distribute among themselves the benefit of their 
cooperation in accordance with the value of their contributions. The 
ability of each owner of a factor of production to withhold her 
contribution should ensure that each owner receives a share 
commensurate with the marginal value of that contribution. The 
principles of transactional justice, assuming they are applied in practice, 
will ensure that no one is deprived of her fair share of the cooperative 
product through fraud, deceit, coercion, or the like. Again, if each 
individual has the exclusive rights to her own endowment—as the 
inapplicability of distributive justice in the absence of social cooperation 
would seem to indicate—then each individual has, by implication, the 
exclusive rights to the value of her contribution to the joint enterprise. 
Whatever she receives in exchange for that contribution is hers by right. 
In contrast, the case for a Rawlsian distribution is premised on the 
argument that an individual has no intrinsic right to the wealth she 
produces. The absence of any prior claim of an individual to the wealth 
she produces enables society to redistribute that wealth in accordance 
with the difference principle. To posit otherwise would result in 
redistribution being tantamount to theft, as is argued, in fact, by 
libertarians. 
Thus, the attempt to base domestic Rawlsianism on the benefit 
apportionment argument is impaled on the horns of a dilemma. If one 
posits that redistribution is inapplicable in a state of nature and that 
individuals in such a state are entitled to benefit from morally arbitrary 
factors, it follows that they would also be entitled to retain whatever they 
received in exchange for agreeing to cooperate in the joint production of 
wealth. Redistribution would be unjustifiable. On the other hand, if one 
posits that justice requires the neutralization of the effects of morally 
arbitrary factors even in the absence of social interaction, then, regardless 
of the existence or extent of international cooperation, the redistribution 
would need to be global in scope. 
Arguing both for a natural right to the product of one’s labor—or, 
more broadly, of the return from the use of any of one’s means of 
production—and for a redistribution is not necessarily contradictory. In 
fact, my own position, as will be developed further on, incorporates both 
of these elements. The position presented here is merely that such a 
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natural right is inconsistent with a Rawlsian redistribution. 
 
B.  National Association Argument 
 
Another attempt to restrict the application of Rawlsian redistribution 
is the argument that national association is what creates the rights and 
obligations associated with distributive justice. Without the ties implied 
by such association, goes the argument, the rules of distributive justice 
are inapplicable. However, this claim raises an important question: why 
is distributive justice inapplicable in the absence of national association, 
or, contrapositively, why is national association a necessary condition for 
distributive justice? 
 
1.  Sympathy 
 
One attempt to support the national association argument is based on 
the claim that people naturally feel close to those with whom they share a 
common bond and a common destiny. Co-nationalists meet these criteria 
and evoke, therefore, a certain degree of altruistic concern. Thus people 
are usually willing to share their wealth with their compatriots beyond 
the extent to which they are willing to share with others with whom they 
do not share these common bonds.37
I see no reason to dispute the factual basis of this claim, which is 
evidenced, for example, by the press coverage of a natural disaster or an 
act of war or terrorism. The news services of a given country usually 
devote disproportionate attention to the fate of victims who happen to be 
nationals of that country. Presumably, the extent of this coverage results 
from the fact that the public is, or is assumed to be, particularly 
interested in the welfare of its compatriots. One may assume that people 
 37. DANIEL BELL, COMMUNITARIANISM AND ITS CRITICS 150 n.33 (1993) (“That our sense 
of solidarity is strongest where ‘us’ means something smaller and more local than the human race 
provides a strong argument against the feasibility of a world-wide system of distributive 
justice . . . .”); CANOVAN, supra note 9, at 28–29 (observing that social justice theorists implicitly 
take for granted that demands for distributive justice are applicable within a community of members 
committed to sharing social goods); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 207 (1986) (noting that 
political obligations are dependent upon fraternity among members of the political community); 
WILL KYMLICKA, POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR: NATIONALISM, MULTICULTURALISM AND 
CITIZENSHIP 225 (2001) (observing that people are willing to sacrifice for others only when there is 
a “sense of common identity and common membership uniting donor and recipient, such that 
sacrifices being made for anonymous others are still, in some sense, sacrifices for ‘one of us’”); 
AVISHAI MARGALIT, THE ETHICS OF MEMORY 74–76 (2002) (arguing that a nation can be an ethical 
community, but it is unreasonable to expect that all of humanity can be one, as caring requires 
contrast); RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 190–91 (1989) (noting that 
moral obligations are toward those with whom we feel a sense of solidarity); TAMIR, supra note 9, at 
121 (“The ‘others’ whose welfare we ought to consider are those we care about . . . .”). 
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will be more receptive to sharing their wealth with their fellow nationals 
than with others with whom they do not feel this common bond.38
Nevertheless, feelings of closeness cannot ground claims of 
distributive justice. More pointedly, lack of these feelings cannot ground 
a denial of claims to distributive justice. A person’s willingness to share 
his or her wealth with another individual or group of individuals, while 
perhaps laudable, is altruistic, and altruism is a concept considerably 
different from distributive justice. Justice is the set of principles which 
delineate those things to which an individual has a moral claim. Altruism 
is a selfless act by an individual after all claims of justice have been 
satisfied; it involves the voluntary waiver of just claims, or the voluntary 
and unreciprocated transfer, for the benefit of others, of justly held 
economic resources.39
Justice is not altruism. One who gives another his due is no more 
altruistic than a trustee who transfers trust property to the beneficiary. If 
for whatever reason legitimate claims of justice are not legally 
enforceable, then voluntarily satisfying those claims is laudable; it is not, 
however, altruistic. Returning lost property to its rightful owner, when 
that person does not know what happened to his property and is thus 
unable to take action to enforce his rights, is laudable. However, it is 
laudable precisely because it involves satisfying a claim of justice which 
would otherwise go unsatisfied. No altruism is involved aside from the 
effort exerted in returning the item, assuming the actor was not 
compensated for this effort. In order for the act to be considered truly 
altruistic, the actor must have a legitimate option to use the item in his 
possession for his own benefit. An altruistic act is an act beyond the call 
of moral duty. Sharing one’s wealth with those of one’s choosing is 
legitimate with regard to altruism, but it is not true with regard to justice. 
Claims of justice must be satisfied without regard to one’s feelings 
toward those to whom one owes moral duties. Not liking someone is not 
a legitimate reason to steal from him; it is a legitimate reason not to give 
him a gift. 
Sympathy with the fate of one’s compatriots, like sympathy with the 
fate of the members of one’s family, clan, or ethnic group, cannot, 
therefore, affect the just claims of outsiders. “I cannot give to you that to 
which you are entitled because I prefer to give it to someone close to me” 
is not justice; it is embezzlement. The idea that national feelings can 
somehow limit justice and confine it to the boundaries of a state must, 
 38. In fact, the apparent greater willingness to share with compatriots will be an important 
element in the position I will develop later on. 
 39. Where the recipient is less well-off than the donor, and the donor’s motivation in making 
the gift is to mitigate inequality, the act might be described as heroic. See infra Part IV.F. 
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therefore, be rejected. 
 
2.  Possession of talents 
 
A second attempt to ground the national association argument is the 
claim that the talents of a society and the wealth derived from those 
talents belong to members of that society and are, therefore, theirs to 
dispose of and to distribute as they see fit.40 This claim is, in some ways, 
similar to the benefit apportionment argument considered above. They 
both proceed from the assumption that those who are not part of the 
economic institutions concerned have no right to share in the 
distribution. On the other hand, the emphasis of each argument is 
different. The benefit apportionment argument proceeds from Rawls’s 
claim that justice concerns the fair distribution of the benefits of social 
cooperation. The claim presently being considered is that the country 
possessing the talents has the intrinsic right to distribute the product of 
these talents as it sees fit. 
However, talents are most immediately possessed by individuals. 
Indeed, when individuals with talents belong to a society, the talents may 
be said, as a factual matter, to be possessed by that society. However, in 
the same way, when those individuals are part of the human race, it may 
be said that the talents are possessed by humanity. If the possessor of 
talents is entitled to distribute the economic advantage derivable 
therefrom, then identifying the possessor of the talents would appear to 
entail far-reaching consequences. Asserting that the individual possesses 
the talents and the right to benefit from them undermines Rawlsian 
redistribution and leads toward libertarianism. Identifying humanity as 
the possessor leads to cosmopolitanism. Thus, it appears arbitrary to 
claim that the country possesses the talents and is free to distribute the 
benefits as it sees fit.41
However the problem with this particular claim, which proceeds 
from the assumption that a talent-possession society has the right to 
exclude outsiders from benefiting from them, goes deeper. The 
proposition is Nozickian in nature and appears to undermine not only 
 40. DAVID MILLER, ON NATIONALITY 84–85 (1995) (arguing that social justice occurs 
mainly within national communities and that each community is entitled to the resources created by 
its own members); Sandel, supra note 9, at 20–24 (describing, and rejecting, Rawls’s argument that 
talents are the property of the community). 
 41. Imagine, for example, that particular talents are located in an individual who is part of an 
ethnic community in a given country. Are the talents possessed by (a) the individual, (b) the ethnic 
community, (c) the country, or (d) humanity? Choice (c), the only answer which would justify 
domestic Rawlsianism, is not incorrect; it is simply not more correct than any other answer. Reliance 
on that answer to justify domestic Rawlsianism is hardly compelling. 
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cosmopolitanism, but domestic Rawlsian distribution as well. If mere 
possession creates entitlement, as Nozick argued,42 then, just as the 
country has an entitlement vis-à-vis the rest of the world, the individual 
would have an entitlement vis-à-vis the rest of society. In other words, 
were a given society to say to other societies that it has the right to 
exclude them from benefiting from the talents it possesses, then, when 
the society in question came to distribute internally the resources at its 
disposal, it would be open to a compelling claim by the individual in 
whom those talents resided that he has the right to exclude his 
compatriots from benefiting from his talents. Of course, countering this 
argument by pointing out that the particular individual possesses those 
talents by mere happenstance and that as a consequence he has no moral 
claim to the wealth which those talents generate exposes the society in 
question to a similar claim by foreigners. The result, again, is that 
rejecting cosmopolitanism leads to libertarianism and rejecting 
libertarianism leads to cosmopolitanism. The present argument thus fails 
to provide a coherent doctrine capable of rejecting both libertarianism 
and cosmopolitanism in favor of the middle position of domestic 
Rawlsianism. 
 
3.  Associative obligations 
 
Some commentators have argued that the very act or circumstance of 
association creates among its members rights and corresponding 
obligations, the nature of which depend upon the type of organization. 
These mutually held rights and obligations are not necessarily dependant 
upon an individual voluntarily joining the association or consenting to 
the others joining. The mere circumstance of membership in the 
association is enough to create a bond of rights and obligations which 
does not exist vis-à-vis non-members.43
When the association concerned is a state, the rights and obligations 
concerned include those of distributive justice. Wealthy members of the 
society have an obligation of concern towards less well-off members 
and, consequently, are required to share their wealth with them. The 
wealthy of country A, however, lacking any associative relationship with 
the poor of country B, have no duty of concern for them.44
The problem with this argument, however, is that it assumes the very 
proposition which it purports to prove. The question of why involuntary 
 42. NOZICK, supra note 1, at 225–26. 
 43. DWORKIN, supra note 37, at 197–98; MILLER, supra note 40, at 83; WALZER, supra note 
9, at 31. 
 44. TAMIR, supra note 9, at 100–01. 
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association creates rights and obligations—and in particular why national 
association creates the rights and obligations inherent to distributive 
justice—is left unexplained. 
Voluntary association in an institution often involves the assumption 
of certain obligations. These obligations may be explicit or implicit, legal 
or moral, long-term or temporary. A group of individuals who meet once 
a week to play basketball may take upon themselves, through their 
behavior, the obligation to play at a certain level of seriousness, and to 
inform each other of a change in time or venue. Membership in a trade 
union implies cooperation for the sake of achieving the best working 
conditions for all. The obligations of friendship are more complicated 
and depend to a great extent on the degree of friendship and the terms 
implicitly agreed upon through the behavior of the parties. In all these 
cases, however, the obligations are consensual. A person is not obligated 
to more than the terms of association warrant. The mere fact of 
association, even voluntary association, does not imply rights and duties 
of distributive justice. 
Certain associations, it is true, are founded upon terms which 
simulate distributive justice. For example, membership in a classic 
kibbutz requires the individual to accept principles of economic and 
social cooperation based upon the Marxist concept of “[f]rom each 
according to his ability, and to each according to his needs.”45 
Nevertheless, the source of these obligations is not the moral duties of 
abstract distributive justice, but rather the contractual relationship among 
the members. 
National association—in contrast to the relationships defined by 
friendship or by membership in a trade union or a kibbutz—is by and 
large involuntary.46 For most individuals, nationality is determined by the 
place of their birth or by the nationality of their parents. Because of the 
dearth of choice with respect to nationality, imposing the obligations of 
 45. Karl Marx, Marginal Notes to the Programme of the German Workers’ Party, in 
CRITIQUE OF THE GOTHA PROGRAMME 17 (Foreign Languages Press, Peking. 1st ed. 1972) (1875); 
see NAAMA SABAR, KIBBUTZNIKS IN THE DIASPORA 7 (2000) (noting the relationship of the 
traditional purposes of the kibbutz and Marx’s communist ideal, in that “[t]he kibbutz was 
traditionally based on the premise that the individual contributes to the collective according to 
his/her ability and in return the kibbutz provides for all his/her needs”). 
 46. Where national association is voluntary, one might view the obligations implicit in such 
association as contractual. For example, a person who voluntarily immigrates to, and is naturalized 
in, a socialist country might be considered as having taken upon herself the terms of association of 
that country. Her subsequent complaints regarding the high level of taxes imposed to finance public 
services and transfer payments could be more easily ignored than similar complaints by one born in 
the country. In the same way, a person who voluntarily immigrated to a traditional, strongly 
patriarchal society would have considerably less standing to object to the structure of that society 
than would a native-born individual. In both instances, the immigrant chose to live under those 
terms. The inherent justice in the structure is therefore less relevant as far as she is concerned. 
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distributive justice because of nationality cannot be seen as resulting 
from any obligation undertaken by an individual when joining the 
association. The question of why the happenstance of national 
association creates such obligations remains unanswered. 
Supporters of the national association argument may, nevertheless, 
claim that a person does not choose his family and yet the obligations a 
person has towards other members of his family are perhaps the most 
intense of any obligatory duty. Analogizing from the family to the 
country, a person may have obligations merely by being a member of a 
country whether or not he chose that status.47 This argument merits 
serious attention. Nevertheless, it must fail. The fact that family 
attachment imposes certain obligations does nothing to further the 
national association argument. 
The first problem with extrapolating from obligations toward one’s 
family to obligations toward one’s compatriots is that the moral source of 
obligations toward one’s relatives is itself not clear. With regard to one’s 
spouse and one’s children—those individuals toward whom one is 
normally assumed to have the most intense obligations—the question can 
be sidestepped by noting that in almost all cases, marriage and 
parenthood are the result of voluntary acts. By marriage or by 
procreation a person explicitly or implicitly accepts the obligations 
inherent in the consequent relationship. 
The obligations of children toward their parents are much more 
limited and might be grounded in terms of reciprocity. That is, children 
may have duties toward their parents in view of the support which they 
themselves received, even though their parents, by the very act of 
begetting children, unconditionally accepted upon themselves the 
obligation to support their progeny.48 With regard to other relatives, 
however, both the scope and the grounding of one’s obligation are far 
from clear. What is the nature and extent of one’s obligations toward 
one’s sibling, uncle, aunt, niece, nephew, cousin, or more distant 
relation, merely by dint of the family connection?49 Why is one so 
obliged? These questions warrant analysis beyond the scope of the 
present work. However—and this is the essential point—analogizing 
from a type of obligation whose scope and grounding are themselves so 
 47. DWORKIN, supra note 37, at 201; WALZER, supra note 9, at 41 (“[S]tates are like 
families . . . for it is a feature of families that their members are morally connected to people they 
have not chosen . . . .”). 
 48. For this reason most people, for example, would probably feel that a child abandoned by 
his parents has little or no obligation toward them. 
 49. Relatives may, of course, also be friends, and in those cases the obligations of friendship 
and of family—neither of which is in any case explicitly delineated—would commingle. The text, 
however, is considering obligations based merely on the family relationship. 
  
286 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 21  
 
unclear is difficult at best and useless at worse. 
Second, even if obligations based upon family relationship were 
sufficiently clear to show that involuntary associations could create 
mutual rights and obligations, it certainly would not show that every 
involuntary association actually does so.50 The question of whether or not 
the mere fact of citizenship or residency in a given country constitutes 
the type of involuntary association entailing mutual rights and 
obligations cannot be satisfactorily resolved by a claim, however well 
founded, that it is not impossible for involuntary association to do so. 
Third, even assuming that the analogy with the family is sufficiently 
convincing to permit the conclusion that national association does entail 
mutual rights and obligations, such an analogy could not successfully 
ground the associative obligation argument. It must be convincingly 
demonstrated that national association not only entails mutual rights and 
obligations, but it must also be shown that these rights and obligations 
include Rawlsian distributive justice. To the best of my knowledge, no 
supporter of domestic Rawlsianism has offered such a proof. 
Furthermore, it would appear that such a demonstration would be highly 
unlikely. The specific entitlements and responsibilities vis-à-vis relatives 
outside of the nuclear family may not be entirely clear; however, what 
may be stated with a fair degree of certainty is that they are not normally 
considered to include Rawlsian distributive justice. Such being the case, 
it appears impossible to derive obligations of national distributive justice 
from the mutual rights and obligations of the non-nuclear family. 
 
4.  National association argument: Concluding thoughts 
 
While perhaps striking a certain intuitive chord, the national 
association argument cannot be accepted on a priori grounds, but 
requires a demonstration of what exactly there is about national 
association that grounds claims of justice. In my opinion, claims 
advanced to support this thesis fail the test of serious analysis. In fact, 
even proponents of the argument often admit the weakness of the claims 
they themselves advance.51
Why, then, does the national association argument continue to be 
raised? It may be that its true source is the intuitively based assumption 
that rules of distributive justice do not apply to foreigners or, 
alternatively, that obligations and rights of distributive justice are 
somehow less binding, or are secondary to, rights and obligations 
 50. The fact that membership in certain associations bestows some benefit cannot support a 
claim to Rawlsian redistribution. See supra Part II.A. 
 51. See, e.g., TAMIR, supra note 9, at 117–21. 
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towards compatriots. National association seems to many to be both a 
necessary and a sufficient condition for the operation of distributive 
justice. Nevertheless, when the conclusion is subject to rigorous analysis, 
it is found wanting. Despite the fact that every explanation proposed to 
justify it fails to do so, the argument spawns an ipso facto life of its own 
and becomes self-sustaining. National association is offered forth as its 
own proof of validity.52 It does not require a great deal of training in the 
art of rhetoric to spot the weakness of this attempt to ground the 
argument. 
 
C.  Original Position Argument 
 
One attempt to justify domestic Rawlsianism posits that individuals 
in Rawls’s “original position” would opt for institutions designed to 
distribute a society’s resources in accordance with Rawlsian principles 
but would refrain from cross-border redistribution.53 Rational, self-
serving individuals who knew that they would be members of a 
prosperous society would want to mitigate or eliminate the risk that they 
would be among the least well-off in that society and would therefore 
presumably adopt an internal Rawlsian redistribution of wealth. 
Knowing that they were to be members of a well-to-do society, rational 
self-interest would indicate that they would refrain from sharing their 
wealth with less fortunate foreigners. 
The problem with this argument is that the only method by which to 
achieve a consensus for domestic Rawlsianism would be to limit 
participation in the mechanism of the original position to individuals who 
knew that they would be members of a prosperous society.54 Completely 
risk-averse individuals who knew that they had only one life to live and 
who knew that there existed the possibility that they would be among the 
world’s poorest would not agree to a scheme whereby rich countries 
would be entitled to redistribute wealth internally and to ignore the 
condition of those located outside their borders. Nor would they agree to 
a scheme whereby individuals residing in a given country would have 
any sort of prior claim to the wealth which happened to be located in or 
 52. Id. at 121 (rejecting arguments based on sympathy and associative obligations, 
nevertheless concluding that “[t]he ‘others’ whose welfare we ought to consider are those . . . who 
are relevant to our associative identity,” and  “the community-like nature of the nation-state is 
particularly well suited, and perhaps even necessary, to the notion of the liberal welfare state”). 
 53. Id. at 113. 
 54. RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 9, at 26, 30–32, 82–83; see also RAWLS, supra 
note 1, at 377–78 (principles of justice apply to societies as units and are agreed upon by members of 
those societies in the original position). 
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produced by that country.55
Limiting participation to members of a given society begs the 
question of the justification for such a limitation. Since national 
affiliation is undeserved and therefore arbitrary from a moral point of 
view, it is unclear why only the views of those known to be nationals of a 
given country should be taken into account in deciding issues of justice. 
One could similarly convene an assembly of individuals who knew that 
they were going to be members of a particular ethnic group or of a 
certain social class. The principles of distributive justice which would 
emerge from such conventions would differ radically from the principles 
which would emerge were the participants put in a “pure” original 
position, in which they would be given no information about their 
condition. In fact, by carefully screening participation in the convention 
and by monitoring the information given to the participants, one could 
probably compel the adoption of just about any theory of distributive 
justice one chose. 
Thus the original position argument does not appear to have any 
basis in Rawlsian philosophy. Lifting the veil of ignorance by allowing 
certain individuals, who know which society they are to be members of, 
to determine how resources are to be allocated is inconsistent with the 
principles underlying the use of the original position to establish 
principles of justice.56
 
D.  Functionality and Pragmatic Arguments 
 
1.  Domestic redistribution as furthering international redistribution 
 
Another attempt to justify domestic Rawlsianism is the argument that 
cosmopolitanism is best achieved by each country implementing a 
Rawlsian redistribution within its own borders. Were each country to do 
so individually, it is argued, the result would be a global Rawlsian 
redistribution. Furthermore, the argument states that adoption of a regime 
of domestic redistribution is not inconsistent with cosmopolitanism; 
rather, domestic redistribution supports and furthers the aim of 
cosmopolitanism. 57
However, a global difference principle would require that resources 
 55. See POGGE, supra note 23, at 242. 
 56. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 12 (noting that the veil of ignorance “ensures that no one is 
advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the 
contingency of social circumstances”). 
 57. CANOVAN, supra note 9, at 34; MILLER, supra note 40, at 51–53 (referring to ethical 
obligations in general and not specifically to Rawlsian redistribution). 
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be distributed first to foreigners when they are worse off than the worst-
off compatriots. Recall that for Rawls, the preferred distribution is that in 
which the distributive shares of the worst-off are maximized, even where 
overall or average utility is sacrificed.58 Therefore, even if logistic 
difficulties mean that fewer foreigners than locals would be helped or 
that more of the resources would be used for the expenses of the 
distribution process itself, the difference principle would nevertheless 
require that the wealth be redistributed internationally so as to maximize 
the welfare of the worst off. 
 
2.  Ineffectiveness of international redistribution 
 
A related claim, which simply takes the functionality argument to an 
extreme, is that the mechanism for international redistribution is 
nonexistent.59 Given the institutions presently available, a state, try as it 
might, is simply incapable of doing anything to ease the plight of poor 
individuals outside its borders. Resources which it attempts to devote to 
international redistribution are, in essence, merely being thrown away.60
The difference principle holds that when the welfare level of the 
worst-off is the same under alternative distributions, the favored 
distribution will be the one in which the welfare of the next worse off is 
maximized and so forth.61 It would seem to follow that if the state’s 
redistribution policy can have no effect on the welfare of certain 
individuals, then the welfare of the least well-off who can be affected 
should be maximized. 
By the terms of the functionality argument, the welfare of those 
outside the state’s borders is unaffected by any action the state may take. 
Even if those located in foreign countries include the world’s worst-off 
individuals, their fate should be effectively ignored when determining the 
ideal distribution. Thus, when foreigners cannot be affected by a state’s 
redistribution policies, implementation of a scheme of domestic 
Rawlsianism would in fact be the most the state could do to further a 
global Rawlsian redistribution. 
However, this argument proceeds from a faulty factual premise. It is 
true that the institutions of the developed world are ordinarily vastly 
more efficient than corresponding institutions in underdeveloped 
 58. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 76–78. 
 59. See AMY GUTMANN, LIBERAL EQUALITY 171–72 (1980); Samuel Freeman, Introduction: 
John Rawls – An Overview, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS  1, 50–51 (Samuel Freeman 
ed., 2003). 
 60. For example, donor countries have few means at their disposal to ensure that the funds 
they contribute actually reach the most needy in the poorer countries. 
 61. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 83. 
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countries or than international institutions, assuming they exist at all. It 
is, therefore, true that domestic redistribution is ordinarily easier than 
international redistribution and that the costs of the distributive process 
itself are considerably less. Nonetheless, it is not accurate to claim that 
international redistribution is realistically impossible. Developed 
countries, as evidenced by their actions, do not apparently believe so 
either. Most, after all, do give some amount of foreign aid. One may 
assume that they would not do so unless they were convinced of its 
potential effectiveness.62
Furthermore, to the extent that the argument is true and that attempts 
at international redistribution are doomed to failure for lack of an 
institutional structure to support them, the conclusion should not be that 
justice is satisfied by domestic Rawlsianism. Instead, the conclusion 
should be that the international institutions as presently construed are 
unjust, hardly an earth-shattering revelation.63
Finally, consider the case of individuals living in developed 
countries, where the means of distribution are relatively efficient. Why 
should the wealthy of one country be obliged to share their wealth with 
disadvantaged members of their own society to a greater extent than they 
are obliged toward disadvantaged members of the other country?64 The 
argument that there are no effective means of redistributing wealth is 
certainly not applicable, especially considering that the well-off of each 
country are expected, under a Rawlsian model, to share their wealth with 
their own society’s disadvantaged. 
 
 
 
 
 
 62. The argument presented is not that countries necessarily give foreign aid out of a sense of 
moral duty as opposed, for example, to altruism. The point is that, whatever their motives, their 
actions indicate an acknowledgement on their part that transfer payments to underdeveloped 
countries can be effective, even considering the inefficiency of the institutions involved. 
 63. KOK-CHOR TAN, JUSTICE WITHOUT BORDERS: COSMOPOLITANISM, NATIONALISM, AND 
PATRIOTISM 26 (2004) (stating that international institutions are often accomplices in the 
exploitation of weaker states). 
 64. It is interesting to note the following comment by John Arthur and William H. Shaw: 
[D]isparity of wealth itself cannot be the source of . . . injustice. (Only in a cosmic or 
poetic sense is it unjust for me to thrive on my Iowa farm while you barely eke out an 
existence in the Yukon.) If we are to speak of justice at all, there must be some relation 
between the parties by virtue of which a right is violated or an unfairness done. 
John Arthur & William H. Shaw, On the Problem of Economic Justice, in JUSTICE AND ECONOMIC 
DISTRIBUTION 5 (John Arthur & William H. Shaw eds., 2d ed. 1991). Note that the authors refer to 
the lack of obligation of a resident of Iowa toward a resident of the Yukon and not, for example, 
toward a resident of Alaska. 
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3.  Lack of support for international redistribution 
 
Another claim raised under the banner of pragmatic arguments is that 
the voters in the wealthy countries would never accept anything close to 
cosmopolitanism and that seekers of international justice should 
therefore moderate their demands in order to have any hope of success.65 
This claim, however, is perhaps the least valid of all. If wealthy countries 
are not morally entitled to their holdings, then the question of whether or 
not the voters in those countries are willing to share the wealth they 
possess is immaterial. If analogies are appropriate here, consider the 
unwillingness of the aristocracy to waive their feudal privileges; the 
long-standing refusal of the South African government, representing the 
majority of white voters, to grant suffrage to the rest of the population; or 
the decision by a hypothetical thieves’ guild to reject the concept of 
restitution. In each case, the possessors of a social good desire to 
continue holding on to it. They may even have the physical or political 
power to reject competing claims. Nevertheless, possession, desire, and 
power do not justify a claim. 
It is true that a reformer might, for practical reasons, choose those 
battles which she feels she may be able to win. Perhaps it is better to 
work, with some chance of success, for a slightly less unjust world than 
to labor futilely for a much more just one. Nevertheless, the degree to 
which those in possession of the social good respond to pleas for justice 
cannot in itself be a factor in determining whether their holdings are 
theirs by right. 
 
E.  The Failure of Domestic Rawlsianism 
 
Rawls’s contention that the natural distribution is unfair and that 
people do not deserve their talents, their social position, or their good or 
bad luck has considerable persuasive force.66 When confronted with 
those who are not fortunate enough to possess the talents necessary to 
achieve a lifestyle easily attainable by others, it is difficult to deny the 
arbitrariness inherent in nature’s selection of whom to favor.67
Rawls’s subsequent claim, regarding a positive moral duty to 
 65. CHARLES JONES, GLOBAL JUSTICE: DEFENDING COSMOPOLITANISM 77 (1999) (referring 
to such views); KYMLICKA, supra note 37, at 225. 
 66. Even where talents are diligently developed over a long period of time and might 
therefore be considered to have an element of desert attached to them, the industriousness and 
patience which enabled their development were themselves not deserved. 
 67. As noted earlier, even Nozick felt obliged to concede the point. NOZICK, supra note 1, at 
225. 
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neutralize the effects of nature’s unfairness,68 is more contentious. One 
might accept the arbitrariness of the natural distribution without agreeing 
that human society has an obligation to do anything about it. The maxim 
“life is unfair” is both an admission of the capriciousness of nature and 
an admonition to ignore the unfairness. It may be argued that a 
psychologically healthy individual will focus on what he has and on 
doing the best he can with it, rather than dwelling on the unfairness of 
life. 
National affiliation would appear to be one of those arbitrary 
attributes whose impact upon an individual’s life chances should, from a 
Rawlsian viewpoint, be neutralized. However, even those social 
philosophers who ostensibly view wealth redistribution as a primary 
demand of justice do not, in general, ascribe to the internationalization of 
domestic distributive principles. Some simply refuse to consider 
international aspects of redistribution, indicating their hesitation to 
extend the principles they extol to cover those living outside the borders 
of the state; others, including Rawls himself, go to great lengths to justify 
either limiting the scope of redistribution to the domestic arena or 
adopting different standards of justice for domestic and international 
redistribution. 
Where a principle leads inexorably towards a result contrary to 
ordinary intuition, one is faced with the choice of abandoning the 
principle or rejecting the intuition. If, as most social philosophers appear 
to believe, the intuitive rejection of an international Rawlsian 
redistribution is well founded, the most obvious conclusion is that the 
basic tenet of Rawlsianism itself is somehow flawed. Perhaps the idea of 
a positive moral obligation to neutralize the effects of nature’s 
arbitrariness does not conform to our considered judgments after all. 
The rejection of cosmopolitanism, in other words, implies a rejection 
of the underlying principle from which it flows: that morally arbitrary 
attributes cannot serve as the basis for claims of entitlement. This is the 
same principle upon which all of Rawlsian methodology ultimately rests. 
Thus, unless one is willing to embrace cosmopolitanism, one must reject 
Rawlsianism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 68. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 102. 
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III.  NEEDS-BASED JUSTICE 
 
Rejecting Rawlsianism does not require retreating into a libertarian 
worldview. The fact that human society may not be required to mitigate 
the unfairness inherent in nature does not imply that people are relieved 
of all responsibility for the plight of fellow members of their species. 
This Article proposes that the duty to act arises when one individual is in 
need of some good and another is able to satisfy that need at a non-
prohibitive cost to himself. Imagine, for instance, a desert traveler who 
encounters an individual dying of thirst. Assuming that the traveler is 
carrying with her more than enough water to meet her own needs, does 
she have a moral obligation to give the other some water and thus to save 
his life? The proposed duty to act suggests that she does have a moral 
obligation to share her water. Additionally, were she, out of either apathy 
or maliciousness, to ignore the other’s needs and do nothing, she would 
be acting immorally. 
At this point, some may question the source of the traveler’s moral 
obligation to come to the other’s assistance. As the other would be no 
better off had the traveler never existed, the argument could be made that 
the other has no claim to the traveler’s assistance, assuming that the 
traveler is in no way responsible for the other’s predicament and is not 
preventing anyone else from coming to the rescue. The traveler, it may 
be argued, might help if she desires to do so—and such an act might be 
commendable—but she is under no moral obligation to act. I would 
reject this argument and instead contend that the source of the traveler’s 
obligation to assist in this situation is rooted simply in her own 
humanity.69 Although she is in no way responsible for the other’s 
predicament, failure to act would nevertheless constitute a breach of her 
moral duty. Furthermore, it would appear that this position reflects most 
people’s common understanding of their moral obligations. 
Note that the moral obligation of the traveler is not based on 
inequality. It is not grounded on the fact that her possession of a 
sufficient supply of water is the result of factors—foresight, luck, and so 
forth—that are ultimately arbitrary from a moral point of view and that 
she is thus undeservedly better off than the other.70 Were she to 
encounter another person who was simply less wealthy, she would be 
 69. It is admittedly difficult to substantiate this position other than to rely on an intuitive 
sense of what is right. I concede that one who sees nothing wrong with allowing the individual 
encountered to die of thirst in the circumstances described would probably not find the arguments 
presented in this Article compelling. 
 70. Nor, I might add, is it grounded on any claim of transactional or compensatory injustice. 
Again, we assume that the traveler is in no way responsible for the predicament of the other. 
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under no obligation to share her undeserved good fortune. Her obligation 
to assist is based on the other’s needs and on her ability to satisfy those 
needs at a non-prohibitive cost to herself.71
Consider now the situation in which the traveler’s supply of water is 
barely enough to meet her own needs, such that giving some of her water 
to the person she encountered would involve risking her own life. In such 
a situation, she does not have a moral duty to share her water. One is not 
obliged to satisfy the needs of another when the cost or the risk to oneself 
is too great. Herein lies the distinction between moral duty and heroism. 
Heroism involves satisfying the needs of others above and beyond the 
call of moral duty. One who saves another at no risk to himself has 
merely fulfilled a moral duty, whereas one who risks himself to save 
another has acted heroically. 
Saving another at no risk to oneself may be commendable, but the 
commendation would be the equivalent of commending a person for 
driving for years without committing a traffic offence. Although a person 
should not, perhaps, be commended simply for fulfilling his legal 
obligations, the fact is that most of us do occasionally violate traffic 
laws. One who refrains from doing so may, therefore, deserve some 
commendation. The commendable character of the heroic act, however, 
is qualitatively different. If saving the victim involves the assumption of 
sufficient risk, then ignoring the needs of the victim would be a morally 
legitimate course of action. The commendation in this situation is not for 
failure to violate a moral duty, but for acting when no moral duty existed 
in the first place. 
Moral duty comes into play when one is confronted with another 
person in need and the costs or risks of providing that need are not 
prohibitive. Needs, however, must be distinguished from wants. The fact 
that another individual wants something that I have the power to provide 
at little or not cost to myself imposes upon me no moral duty to supply 
that want, unless that want can be classified as a need. Nevertheless, and 
notwithstanding the centrality of the distinction between needs and 
wants, this Article does not attempt to demarcate a line between them. 
Reasonable people can differ with regard to what is a need and what is 
merely a want.72 As a bare minimum, though, anything necessary for the 
 71. Cf. WALZER, supra note 9, at 33 (stating that among strangers, positive assistance is 
required if it is needed urgently by one of the parties and the risks and costs of giving it are relatively 
low for the other party). 
 72. See KATE SOPER, ON HUMAN NEEDS: OPEN AND CLOSED THEORIES IN A MARXIST 
PERSPECTIVE 6–18 (1981) (arguing that the distinction between needs and wants is a political issue); 
WALDRON, supra note 19, at 264; DAVID WIGGINS, NEEDS, VALUES, TRUTH: ESSAYS IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF VALUE 2–17 (1987) (discussing different ways of distinguishing between needs and 
wants and focusing on the degree of harm envisioned if the need or want is not met). 
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sustaining of life could be universally recognized as a need. 
Similarly, this Article does not delineate exactly what cost or what 
risk might be considered prohibitive. Again, reasonable people might 
come to different conclusions. However, at least in the extreme cases, it 
should be possible to reach universal consensus. For example, where one 
is capable of saving another’s life at a cost that would not seriously affect 
the welfare level of the actor, failing to act is an abrogation of moral 
duty. 
The next step is to apply this conception of moral obligation to the 
traditional realm of distributive justice. Any definition of material needs, 
as opposed to wants, would have to include those goods and services 
necessary for physical survival. Reasonable persons may, of course, 
argue that material needs include more than mere sustenance, that an 
individual requires the means not just to live but also to make life 
worthwhile.73 Nevertheless, this Article focuses on sustenance because 
basic sustenance would certainly be included in any reasonable basket of 
material needs. It would be hard to argue that a person only wants, but 
does not need, enough food to avoid starvation; that he only wants, but 
does not need, access to a potable water supply; or that he only wants, 
but does not need, some protection from the elements.74 Such being the 
case, it would follow that people, individually and collectively, who 
know that others are lacking basic sustenance and who are capable of 
satisfying that need have the moral obligation to do so, provided that the 
cost of providing such needs is not prohibitive. 
Because needs-based justice limits claims of justice to the 
satisfaction of needs, it is more restrictive than inequality-based justice. 
The mere fact that individual A undeservedly has more of X than does 
individual B is not sufficient grounds under needs-based justice to 
impose a duty, even a prima facie duty, to redistribute. Needs-based 
justice, while recognizing the arbitrariness of the natural distribution, 
does not oblige humanity to right the wrongs of Mother Nature.75 Thus, 
the “merely rich” would have no claim of distributive justice against the 
“super rich,” even though their difference in wealth is presumably 
undeserved. An inequality-based argument for redistribution, on the 
other hand, would hold that because one has more than the other, despite 
 73. Even among those accepting such a premise, the question of what it takes to make life 
worth living—or, more specifically, what are the material resources which would enable a person to 
make his life worth living—is obviously debatable. 
 74. Rawls, who seems to adopt a needs-based approach to international justice, similarly does 
not define basic needs. RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLE, supra note 9, at 119. 
 75. Or, more accurately, to mitigate nature’s unfairness, as nature cannot be judged in terms 
of right and wrong. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 102. 
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the lack of desert, a claim for redistribution would ostensibly arise.76
 
A.  Choice and Responsibility 
 
With regard to the role of choice and responsibility in determining 
the demands of justice, the obligations of needs-based justice are broader 
than those of inequality-based justice. For inequality-based claims to 
redistribution, a time slice comparison is patently inappropriate. The fact 
that, at a given moment in time, one individual is wealthier than another 
cannot serve as the basis of a claim for mitigating the inequality. 
Assume, for example, that at time t0, two individuals are similarly 
situated by whatever criteria are considered appropriate. At time t1, 
individual A consumes part of his material holdings while individual B 
chooses to delay consumption until time t3. A time slice comparison of 
the two individuals at time t2 would show that that individual B is better 
off than is individual A.77 Nevertheless, it does not appear that this time-
slice difference in well-being could justify an inequality-based claim to 
redistribution. While it is true that at time t2, B is better off than A, it is 
also true, and more significantly so, that the two of them are, in fact, 
similarly situated over the time interval t0–t3. Forcibly transferring 
resources from B to A at time t2 would actually be creating inequality, not 
mitigating it.78
Another way of analyzing the situation just described is to note that 
at time t0, A and B were both faced with similar choice sets. Each was 
able to choose consumption at time t1 or to delay consumption until time 
t3. Because both individuals were equally wealthy at time t0, neither 
could complain that he was treated unfairly, even if his wealth was less 
than that of the other at a later point in time.79
Comparing various individuals’ distributive shares in terms of 
 76. This is not to say that other approaches to distributive justice would completely ignore 
the difference between needs and wants. Presumably, for example, a utilitarian would place primary 
emphasis on needs over wants, simply because the pleasure associated with the satisfaction of a need 
is quantitatively greater than the pleasure derivable from the satisfaction of a mere want. For needs-
based justice, on the other hand, the distinction is not merely quantitative but qualitative; only needs 
are the basis of positive moral duties. While one is certainly permitted to consider other individuals’ 
wants and to act so as to satisfy them, doing so would be considered, not the fulfillment of one’s 
moral duty, but the performance of an heroic act. 
 77. For the purpose of this analysis, I will ignore such factors as individual A’s pleasant 
memories of his past consumption or his regret at having indulged his desire for immediate 
gratification and the psychological effects of individual B’s anticipation or impatience. 
 78. Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
283, 285–93 (1981). I will assume that the choice to consume immediately was reasonable under the 
circumstances. 
 79. JULIAN LE GRAND, EQUITY AND CHOICE: AN ESSAY IN ECONOMICS AND APPLIED 
PHILOSOPHY 87 (1991). 
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similar choice sets is not necessarily equivalent to comparing their well-
being over time. Consider, for example, the case of three similarly 
situated individuals who are faced with the opportunity to gamble. 
Individual A refrains from gambling, individual B gambles and wins, 
individual C gambles and loses. Whether one compares their situations 
on a time-slice perspective immediately after the payout or whether one 
compares their situations over a time interval which begins before the 
gamble and continues until A and B have both consumed their additional 
resources, the situations of the three individuals concerned are not equal. 
Having gambled successfully, B is by any reasonable measure better off 
materially than either A or C. Having refrained from gambling, A is, 
again by any reasonable measure, better off materially than C. If 
inequality itself were grounds for redistribution, C would appear to have 
a claim against both A and B, while A would have a claim against B. 
Nevertheless, this inequality cannot be traced to any arbitrariness in 
the natural distribution. Each individual concerned was faced with 
equivalent choice sets. Neither A nor C can legitimately claim that that it 
is unfair that he has less resources at his disposal than does B, nor can C 
legitimately claim that it is unfair that he has less than does A.80 Because 
C chose to gamble and A chose to refrain from gambling, any claim of 
unfairness voiced by either of them would appear to be disingenuous. In 
fact, from a choice-set perspective, the three are similarly situated. An 
approach to justice which views redistribution as a means of mitigating 
the arbitrary inequality inherent in the natural distribution—in other 
words, a choice-set, inequality-based approach to justice—would, 
therefore, see no need to redistribute resources from A or B to C or from 
B to A. 
Although choice sets and equality over time are central to inequality-
based justice, they are irrelevant from the perspective of a needs-based 
approach to justice. An individual’s needs and her ability to meet those 
needs are relevant for needs-based justice. It does not matter how the 
individual concerned came to be needy. 
Recall, for instance, the situation discussed above in which 
individual A consumed his resources at time t1, while individual B, 
similarly situated to A at time t0, delayed consumption until time t3. Even 
though B is better off than A at time t2, they are equal over time or over 
choice-sets, such that B would have no obligation towards A under an 
inequality-based system of justice. Nonetheless, if at time t2 A is needy 
and B is in a position to help, a needs-based justice would impose upon B 
 80. Here, too, I am assuming that the decision to gamble was not unreasonable and that a 
reasonable person could have chosen to gamble the same as he could have chosen to refrain from 
gambling. 
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a moral obligation to come to A’s assistance. B may not shirk his moral 
responsibility by pointing to the fact that A consumed excessively at time 
t1 while B saved for the future. 
Admittedly, this aspect of needs-based justice may be 
counterintuitive. A, after all, has no one but himself to blame for his 
predicament. He could have saved for the future, but he chose not to. By 
calling upon B to come to his assistance at time t2, A is in effect asking B 
to subsidize his prior consumption at time t1, when B was frugally 
ferreting away his wealth for the proverbial rainy day. 
Responding to this argument requires consideration of the role of 
desert in a needs-based approach as opposed to its role in an inequality-
based approach. Desert appears to play little or no role in either. Under a 
merit-based system, desert plays a central role: people get exactly what 
they deserve. Inequality-based and needs-based approaches, in contrast, 
consider obligations of distributive justice without reference to desert. 
Nevertheless, the position of desert in a needs-based approach is 
different, if only subtly, from its position in an inequality-based 
approach. 
Ostensibly, desert is irrelevant for inequality-based systems of 
justice, which reject the concept that wealth and poverty are deserved 
and therefore seek to mitigate unequal distribution of resources. 
Nonetheless, desert occupies, in some ways, as important a position in 
inequality-based approaches as it does in merit-based approaches to 
justice. Inequality-based approaches go to great lengths to prove that 
distributional inequality is unrelated to any type of moral desert. They 
rest on the premise that because talents and social position are arbitrary 
from a moral point of view, distributive shares ascribable thereto are 
undeserved. They conclude that, with no claim of desert to material 
holdings, no one may legitimately object to their redistribution. 
Ironically, this line of reasoning begins with a discussion of desert. 
Even though the discussion sets out to prove that notions of desert are 
inapplicable to distributive justice, striving so hard to do so merely 
emphasizes their significance. Were desert really immaterial, the 
question of whether or not talents and social positions were deserved 
would be irrelevant. By basing their arguments on the claim that no 
single person deserves his wealth, inequality-based theories appear to 
accept the meritocratic position that where claims of desert are 
substantiated, distributive share should follow. Egalitarianism is thus 
merely a special case of meritocracy, where desert claims are equal. 
In needs-based justice, desert is a non-factor. Under needs-based 
justice, an individual who, although not needy, is worse off than another 
has no claim to share in that other person’s wealth. Again, the reason is 
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not that his level of well-being is deserved; questions of desert are simply 
irrelevant. However, when a person is in need, others who are able to 
come to his aid at a non-prohibitive cost to themselves, yet ignore the 
need out of apathy or antipathy, are not fulfilling their moral duty. Here, 
too, the entitlement of the needy individual to assistance is not dependent 
upon the undeserved nature of his need; as before, desert is irrelevant. 
Assume, therefore, that the person encountered by the desert traveler 
is there without water due to his own gross negligence. May the traveler, 
where the risk involved in saving the other is not prohibitive, choose 
inaction on the premise that the other has no one to blame but himself for 
the predicament in which he finds himself? Needs-based justice suggests 
that ignoring the victim’s needs and letting him die would be immoral. 
When considering whether or not the desert traveler is morally obliged to 
save another person who is in desperate need of water, the responsibility 
of the victim for his predicament is not relevant.81 Needs-based justice 
would therefore require the rendering of assistance, regardless of how it 
came to be that the individual concerned found herself in a state of 
neediness. If an individual is in need and cannot satisfy those needs, any 
other individual able to help is morally obligated to do so. 
 
B.  Limitations on Needs-Based Justice Claims 
 
As previously noted, one exception to the moral imperative of 
assisting the needy is that an individual is not required to assist when the 
risks or costs involved are prohibitive. In addition to this exception, there 
are two other conditions for entitlement to assistance worth noting. 
The first condition of qualifying for assistance under a needs-based 
justice scheme is that the person concerned is incapable of meeting those 
needs through his own efforts. A person who could work and earn 
enough money to supply his needs but chooses not to has no claim on 
others, including those who could supply those needs at little or no cost 
to themselves. This condition might, at first glance, appear to contradict 
the earlier assertion that desert is irrelevant for need-based justice: Part 
III.A contended that a person’s responsibility for his own predicament 
 81. For example, the past fiscal behavior of elderly individuals who are no longer capable of 
taking care of their own needs—where “taking care of their own needs” refers not to their physical 
state but to their economic state—would be irrelevant. 
  The irrelevance of desert for needs-based justice and the obligation to assist those in need 
whatever responsibility they bear for their own predicament is perhaps an argument for limiting the 
scope of needs and classifying anything much above sustenance level as a want. On the other hand, 
the fact that desert is irrelevant might be an argument in favor of expanding the definition of needs, 
as those who, through no fault of their own, are able to supply their own needs and nothing more are 
not entitled, under a needs-based approach, to redistribution. 
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does not bar his redistributive claim, and this section contends that no 
one has the right to rely on others when he could rely upon himself. 
Nevertheless, the two situations are quite distinct. 
A needy person is one who is incapable of supplying his own needs. 
Thus, by definition, one who is so capable is not needy. On the other 
hand, the fact that a person could have supplied his own needs had he 
acted differently in the past does not disqualify him from being needy, 
provided that at the present time he is no longer capable of supplying his 
own needs. Individuals have some measure of control over the present 
and the future; we cannot change the past. Our inability to affect the past 
manifests itself, for purposes of this discussion, in two ways. First, the 
needs to which needs-based justice refers are limited to present or future 
needs. A person’s past state of well-being might be relevant for 
inequality-based approaches to justice, but it is irrelevant for needs-based 
justice. Needs-based justice can only operate in the present, incapable as 
we are of supplying past needs. Past needs cannot ground a claim for 
needs-based redistribution. 
Secondly, an individual’s past capability to provide for his future 
does not mean that that person is not needy in the present. Past conduct 
can ground an argument of culpability for present needs, but culpability 
is not relevant for needs-based justice and can be ignored. Assume, for 
example, that a person is earning a salary sufficient to supply his needs. 
At this point in time, he obviously cannot claim to be needy. If he quits 
his job, cutting off his only source of income, would he now be 
considered needy? The answer depends on the circumstances. Assuming 
that he could either get his old job back or find a new job, he does not 
meet the criteria of neediness. True, he has needs; but as long as he is 
capable of supplying those needs, he is not needy. Others who know of 
his predicament are under no obligation, individually or collectively, to 
come to his aid. If, however, he is incapable of supporting himself, he 
would meet the criteria. It might be observed that his lack of a job is his 
own fault, as he voluntarily gave up the job he had. In fact, assume that 
he had no justification for quitting his previous job and, furthermore, that 
he did so with full knowledge that he would not be able to get another 
one. In other words, for the sake of argument, assume that he is fully 
culpable for his present predicament. Nevertheless, at this stage, there is 
nothing he can do about it ex hypothesi. Thus, even if he is fully culpable 
for being in a position where he can no longer meet his own needs, he 
would nevertheless be entitled to assistance. 
The second condition is that even one who is in need and is 
incapable of supplying that need himself has no needs-based claim unless 
his needs are capable of being supplied. Although this condition may 
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appear too obvious to mention, it will prove necessary for our future 
discussion. 
 
C.  “Lazy or Crazy” 
 
The theory of justice hitherto described is strongly rooted in widely-
held intuitive conceptions of moral duty. To demonstrate, let us consider 
the reactions people typically have to the problem of homelessness and, 
specifically, what they consider their own obligations toward the 
homeless to be. 
People who are not homeless often feel uncomfortable with the idea 
of homelessness. The discomfort may be rooted in a conflict between 
what people believe to be right and what they perceive to be in their own 
self-interest. 
On the one hand, people instinctively feel that, individually or 
collectively, they should do something about the problem of 
homelessness. The feeling that one should help the homeless is rooted in 
the idea of needs-based justice. Homeless people have needs which are 
not being met, and many people intuitively feel that although they are not 
personally responsible for the plight of the homeless, they have a 
responsibility, if they can, to come to the aid of the homeless. This 
feeling of responsibility is not based on the urge to mitigate economic 
inequality; rather, it is based on their sense of morality 
On the other hand, helping out the homeless often operates against 
what people perceive as their own economic self-interest. They may, 
therefore, intentionally avoid those areas where they are likely to 
confront homeless people. Additionally, they often rationalize their 
inaction, and these rationalizations may help expose their underlying 
belief structure. The possibility that the homeless person is simply 
someone who is down on his luck is the greatest psychological challenge 
to those attempting to rationalize inaction and is consequently rejected 
out of hand. Homeless people, it is often claimed, are “either lazy or 
crazy.” Thus, the rationalization for not coming to the aid of the 
homeless is that people who are lazy are not really needy; they can help 
themselves, so there is no need for others to come forth and help them. 
People who are crazy are beyond help; there is nothing we can do to help 
them because whatever we give them will be squandered anyway. 
This “lazy or crazy” rationalization reveals some important points 
regarding the underlying belief structure. Firstly, someone who is in need 
deserves help. Were this not the case, no rationalization would be 
necessary. Secondly, the only good reasons for not coming to the aid of 
one in need are either (a) he is not truly needy, as he is capable of 
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supplying his own needs, or (b) he is beyond help, such that attempting 
to supply needs is a waste of effort. 
The “lazy” part of the rationalization does not indicate that desert 
intuitively plays an important role in issues of justice. The emphasis is on 
the fact that the individual concerned is, at present, capable of doing 
something about his situation and that he therefore has no right to ask 
others to supply his needs. As previously noted, the difference between 
denying aid because the person is capable of supplying his own needs 
and denying aid because the person is responsible for his own 
predicament has demonstrable consequences when referring to past 
actions. 
Assume that an individual is incapable of working to supply his own 
needs because he was seriously injured in a skiing accident. Assume 
further that the individual was uninsured and undertook the risk in full 
knowledge of the potential consequences. The person concerned is both 
needy and responsible for his state. An inequality-based or choice-based 
approach to justice might deny him any relief on the grounds that he is 
not entitled to compensation from those who refrained from skiing or 
who purchased insurance to protect them in case of an accident—in other 
words, those who refused to gamble—or from those who, although 
uninsured, enjoyed the skiing and escaped the injury—those who 
gambled and won. Nevertheless, the rationalizations for refusing to aid 
the needy do not normally include such sentiments as “he gambled and 
lost.” People are ordinarily willing to allow the consequences of gambles 
to affect well-being, but not to the point of denying people their needs. 
People’s attitude toward the homeless, including the justifications 
they adopt for refusing to render assistance, provide convincing evidence 
that needs-based justice is strongly rooted in our intuitive sense of what 
is right. We instinctively feel that neediness, whatever its cause, must be 
addressed. 
 
D.  Economic Effects 
 
Until now, this Article has ignored the possible economic side effects 
of granting assistance to the needy. When considering the simplified 
cases of individual A, who is in need, and individual B, who is capable of 
satisfying that need, economic effects are irrelevant. The concept of 
neediness, as previously noted, excludes those who are capable 
themselves of satisfying their needs. Thus, describing A as needy is 
operating under the assumption that A is incapable of satisfying his own 
needs, whether or not B comes to his assistance. B could not therefore 
justify his refraining from rendering the requisite aid on the grounds that 
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lending aid would discourage A from helping himself. Thus, the only 
possible scenarios are (1) B helping to meet A’s needs and (2) A’s needs 
being unmet. 
Institutionalizing such a scheme, however, might encourage 
individuals to take greater chances than they ordinarily would and to rely 
on the safety net of needs-based justice to limit their risk. Of course, this 
is not to say that all or even most individuals would dramatically change 
their behavior in response to the institutionalizing of the principles of 
needs-based justice. People whose welfare level is considerably above 
the level of neediness will most likely act to protect themselves from 
falling to that level. They have a strong incentive to allocate the 
necessary funds for medical insurance, retirement, and so forth in order 
to avoid neediness. Their knowledge of the existence of the safety net 
might not play a serious role when the level to which they will be 
allowed to fall before being entitled to assistance is considerably below 
the level to which they have been accustomed. 
On the other hand, for individuals who are barely above the level of 
neediness, the limitation on risk might significantly affect their decision-
making process. When calculating the possible outcomes and the chances 
of the various outcomes occurring, the fact that their needs will always 
be met may encourage some individuals to undertake a particular course 
of action that would not otherwise be worth the risk. This is particularly 
true with regard to insurance and savings. Where the option of relying on 
the safety net is real, the incentive to insure or to save is correspondingly 
reduced. 
The extent to which the institutionalizing of needs-based justice 
would actually affect behavior is an empirical question beyond the scope 
of the present discussion; the normative issue, however, can be 
discussed. Assuming that the institutionalization of needs-based justice 
would, in fact, cause an increase in the number of individuals who would 
not be able to take care of their own needs, the normative question is 
how this fact might affect the obligations inherent in needs-based justice. 
These obligations, as previously discussed, can only be limited if (a) the 
individual concerned is capable of providing for his needs and is 
therefore not truly needy, (b) the needs of the individual concerned are 
incapable of being met, or (c) the risk or cost involved are prohibitively 
high.82 The mere fact that providing for the needy is likely to lead to an 
 82. Could there not be other concerns, outside these three limitations, which would justify a 
refusal to assist? While it is ordinarily difficult to prove an assertion that there are no other 
legitimate concerns, it nevertheless appears to me that these are the only limitations which needs-
based justice could support. If someone is needy (limitation (a)) and his needs are capable of being 
met (limitation (b)) at a non-prohibitive cost (limitation (c)), it is contended that assistance must be 
rendered. 
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increase in the number of individuals who are incapable of satisfying 
their own needs would not, therefore, be relevant unless such increase 
could trigger one or more of the specified conditions. 
If the increase in the number of needy individuals is moderate, such 
that others could continue, albeit at a greater cost to themselves, to 
supply those needs, the obligation to assist is irresistible. In other words, 
human society cannot say to needy individual A, “I refuse to come to 
your assistance, even though you are needy and we are capable of 
supplying those needs, because if we were to do so, individual B might 
soon become needy too and would also require assistance,” provided that 
society is, in fact, capable of supplying the needs both of A and of B. The 
fact that a third party may decide to modify his behavior in a way 
inimical to the interests of one who is called upon to fulfill his moral 
duty cannot justify a breach of that duty.83
However, the situation may be qualitatively different when the 
economic effects are more severe. Consider a scenario in which the 
institutionalization of needs-based justice would encourage a great 
number of individuals to gamble away their ability to satisfy their own 
future needs. Assume further that the projected number of individuals 
who would become needy as the result of such a disincentive is so great 
that the total assistance required would be prohibitively costly and that at 
least some of the needy will not have their needs met. Society would then 
confront the dilemma of satisfying present needs at the cost of meeting 
future needs. Society simply would not be able to provide for all needs, 
whether present or future. In such a case, society could decide that not 
supplying present needs is the lesser of two evils. 
Even in such circumstances, though, the extent to which assistance is 
withheld from the needy must be kept to a minimum. Every denial of 
assistance to an ostensibly entitled individual must contribute to 
prevention of more neediness in the future. Thus, it might be legitimate 
in such cases to discriminate between those who bear responsibility for 
their present state of neediness—in other words, those whose present 
state of neediness is the result of their own past actions—and those who 
could not have reasonably prevented it. The reason is not that those who 
 83. Recall the case of the desert traveler. Assume that giving water to those who need it 
would encourage others to wander in the desert without sufficient water supplies. As long as the 
traveler has enough water to supply her own needs, refusing to come to the aid of those in need 
would still be immoral. 
  However, as the text goes on to argue, where the amount of water carried by the traveler 
and by others like her is likely to prove insufficient to meet the needs of all those they encounter 
wandering in the desert without water and where the only way to prevent people from putting 
themselves is such a predicament is to refuse water to those who need it, the refusal might be 
considered a moral course of action. 
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bear responsibility for their neediness are any less needy or that they 
deserve their neediness. The reason that assistance may be denied is 
strictly utilitarian: the disincentive effects of providing assistance can 
only impact those for whom positioning themselves to be able to satisfy 
their own needs in the future is a realistic possibility. Thus, if it is known 
that only those not responsible for their predicament will be entitled to 
assistance, individuals capable of securing the means to satisfy their own 
needs will not be encouraged to neglect their future needs. 
Distinguishing between the two may, of course, prove impossible in 
practice. 
It should be emphasized, however, that denying assistance to the 
needy must be considered a last resort. If, for example, society’s 
resources are threatened with being stretched beyond capacity, it would 
be preferable to continue to provide for the needs of all the present needy 
and to announce that all those whose future actions or omissions—or, 
better yet, specified acts or omissions—render them needy will not 
receive assistance or will be entitled to a reduced level of assistance. If 
such a declaration of intent is credible, it may be able to avoid the 
disincentive effects and still allow the satisfaction of present needs.84 
Alternatively, it might be reasonable to institute a mandatory social 
security scheme, which would insure individuals against neediness due to 
injury or retirement. 
An additional economic effect that must be taken into account is the 
impact of the redistributive scheme on the behavior of those who would 
be called upon to render the assistance. Supplying the needs of those 
incapable of doing so themselves would presumably be financed through 
taxation. Higher taxes, however, serve as a disincentive to productive 
economic activity, and reduced economic activity means fewer resources 
available for assisting the needy. In other words, the heavier the tax 
burden, the more quickly the cost of providing for the needy is likely to 
prove prohibitive. 
Thus, in determining whether the costs of providing assistance are 
prohibitively high, the question of how the granting of assistance will 
affect people’s future behavior cannot be ignored. If institutionalizing a 
scheme of assistance would, in time, overwhelm society’s capacity to 
assist the needy, limiting the circumstances in which aid is rendered 
would be justified. The imperative of providing for present needs must 
 84. Of course, there will still be individuals who will continue to risk their ability to care for 
their own needs where the potential reward is, in their mind, sufficiently great, or where the chance 
of losing the gamble seems sufficiently small. Under the hypothetical of stretched resources, the 
denial of assistance to those individuals will be necessary to maintain the credibility of the 
institutional mechanism. 
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be balanced against the threat of not being able to meet future needs. 
 
E. Justice and Altruism 
 
An important point to consider is whether the implementation of 
needs-based justice would exhaust human capacity to create a better 
world. Ostensibly, the answer to this query would be negative. Consider 
a world in which the principles of needs-based justice were fully 
realized. The distribution of wealth might still be very unequal. Assume, 
therefore, that a relatively wealthy individual decides to distribute some 
of his wealth to those less fortunate than he. Needs-based justice does not 
require him to do so, as ex hypothesi, all satisfiable needs have already 
been met. Nevertheless, he recognizes that he is no more deserving of 
wealth than others and wants to share what he has. Alternatively, he may 
feel that although he does deserve his wealth, others, due to the presumed 
decreasing marginal utility of material goods,85 might derive greater 
benefit from his holdings than he could. 
Most people would probably feel that the action described would be 
admirable. Most people would probably feel that a world in which 
wealthy people were more generous and more willing to share their 
wealth with others less well-off would be a better place to live. In fact, 
most people would probably feel that a world in which wealth were more 
equally distributed would be better than one in which it were distributed 
less evenly. In fact, it is difficult, with the framework of modern 
philosophy, to argue that unequal distribution of wealth is a goal that 
society should pursue.86 Such being the case, it would seem that even 
after the principles of needs-based justice had been fully implemented, 
there might still be room for improvement as far as distribution of 
economic resources are concerned. Why, therefore, should we consider 
the demands of distributive justice to be satisfied when needs are 
satisfied? Why not include within the demands of justice whatever would 
make the world a better place in which to live? 
The reason to prefer a less extensive definition of justice is that there 
is a fundamental difference between aspiring to a better world and using 
the coercive power of government to achieve that end. Working toward a 
world in which people are more generous, kind, compassionate, and 
caring is an eminently worthwhile goal. Most people would prefer a 
world in which such virtues were prevalent. But legislating generosity 
 85. It is normally presumed that the more material goods one has, the less satisfaction one 
derives from a given increment. 
 86. Cf. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 3–4 (1938) (explaining the tax 
structure in pre-Revolutionary France). 
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and kindness is an exercise in futility. Coercion can only help in 
regulating the most blatant violations of those virtues. Assault, trespass, 
theft, and libel can be legally proscribed, unfriendliness cannot. 
Therefore, the fact that a certain act is widely considered desirable or 
admirable does not mean that requiring the performance of that act 
against the will of the individual concerned is necessarily a step in the 
right direction.87
The inability to coerce what is generally perceived as positive 
behavior is not confined to needs-based justice. It is endemic to most, if 
not all, conceptions of distributive justice. To demonstrate the limits of 
coercion, consider Rawls’s difference principle, the most extensive 
rational redistribution scheme possible.88 As inequality is permitted only 
to the extent that it serves the interests of the worst-off; any further 
equalization of wealth beyond that which is dictated by the difference 
principle would be detrimental to those very interests that the 
redistribution was meant to promote. 
Nevertheless, the difference principle could still result in vast 
discrepancies in wealth. For example, where the imposition of high rates 
of tax on highly skilled individuals would result in them curtailing their 
activities to the detriment of society as a whole—and to the detriment of 
the worst-off members of society in particular—Rawls would condone 
allowing them to retain a greater than average share of wealth. 
Furthermore, in the likely case that it would prove impossible to 
determine the marginal net compensation which would induce the 
optimal exploitation of each particular individual’s talents, the difference 
principle would presumably allow whole classes of individuals to retain 
disproportionately large distributive shares, as long as increasing the tax 
rate on that class of persons would impact negatively on society’s worst-
off members. Despite the resulting, potentially vast, inequality of wealth, 
no state-imposed scheme of redistribution could be more protective of 
the interests of the least well-off. 
Assume now that members of a well-off class decide to donate some 
of their relatively extensive wealth to those not as well-off. Most people, 
including Rawls, would probably view such an altruistic act positively. 
Besides being generous and fostering a sense of community, it would 
create a distribution of resources superior, from a Rawlsian perspective, 
 87. Cf. Alexander McCall Smith, The Duty to Rescue and the Common Law, in THE DUTY TO 
RESCUE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF AID 55, 55 (Michael A. Menlowe & Alexander McCall Smith eds., 
1993) (“[T]here are many moral precepts which are not legally enforceable.” (quoting Malone v. 
Metro. Police Comm’r, (1979) 2 W.L.R. 700 (Ch.)). 
 88. Rawls’s difference principle, it should be noted, is not synonymous with domestic 
Rawlsianism. As discussed in supra Part II, limiting a redistribution to the inhabitants of a single 
country cannot be justified in terms of the difference principle. 
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even to that which could be brought about by the implementation of the 
difference principle itself. Society, of course, cannot require such 
behavior. Due to the overall economic effects, it would be 
counterproductive to do so.89 Society can do no more than simply stand 
on the sidelines and applaud when individuals, from their own inner 
convictions, perform acts of altruism voluntarily. 
Thus, the difference principle, as extensive as it is, is not the last 
word in redistribution. No distributive principle can be. Any distributive 
principle must leave room for voluntary acts of redistribution beyond the 
limits of what justice can rationally impose. 
 
IV.  GOING BEYOND THE REQUIREMENTS OF JUSTICE 
 
Requirements of justice know no geographic boundaries. If justice 
requires the alleviation of need, then alleviation of need is required 
wherever it may be found. Except where the existence of an international 
border poses an impediment to assistance, its existence is irrelevant for 
purposes of justice. 
The question which now arises is whether, in regulating its internal 
affairs, a country may go beyond the requirements of justice. It may not, 
of course, adopt a regime which falls short of satisfying the requirements 
of justice, which are as applicable within a country’s borders as they are 
without. Those who are needy are entitled to assistance from all who are 
able to supply it. The question is whether, having satisfied both its 
internal and external obligations, a country may adopt a tax regime 
whose purpose is to redistribute wealth domestically beyond what justice 
demands. 
An individual, having satisfied the obligations imposed upon him by 
justice and being free to do with his holdings as he pleases, who decides 
to go beyond the demands of justice by transferring part of his holdings 
to others less well-off would be considered heroic and his act 
commendable. It might, therefore, appear that a nation that exceeds the 
demands of justice by instituting an internal redistribution scheme should 
be commended for doing so. However, when an individual goes beyond 
the demands of justice, he is choosing to waive his own use of resources 
for the purpose of benefiting others, even though he is not obliged to do 
so. Thus, were every individual in the country to participate voluntarily 
in the redistribution, there would be no question as to the legitimacy of 
the scheme. Yet redistribution is rarely a voluntary scheme. 
Redistribution ordinarily involves the forcible transfer of wealth from 
 89. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 151. 
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some individuals to others. Thus, it is necessary to determine from what 
source a country derives the right to take from some of its citizens in 
order to give to others. 
 
A.  National Cohesion 
 
An argument can be raised that redistribution contributes to national 
cohesion and fosters a sense of interdependence: compatriots, whether 
they like it or not, share a common political destiny.90 The fates of all 
individuals and of all groups in a society are ultimately intertwined. 
Furthermore, the nation is an essential vehicle for the creation and 
transmission of culture, and national affiliation is central to most 
individuals’ self-definition. 
It might be claimed that excessive inequality weakens the bonds 
which hold a society together. Redistribution of wealth reinforces 
feelings of solidarity and allows the state to serve as a vehicle for 
promoting the economic, cultural, and social interests of its members. 
Furthermore, when a country finds itself in conflict with other countries, 
national cohesion can be crucial to achieving national goals. 
Nevertheless, the question remains as to why redistribution is 
legitimate. However lofty the goals of internal redistribution and 
whatever its contribution to generating feelings of national fraternity, 
why demand that the cost of establishing such interdependence fall on 
some when the advantages are to all? Even assuming that redistribution 
would positively impact national cohesion and further national goals, 
simply pointing out the overall benefits of a certain course of action 
cannot justify the imposition of a tax to transfer the wealth of some to 
others. If the benefits of national cohesion accrue to the nation as a 
whole, then it would seem that the cost should similarly be borne by all. 
 
B.  Relative and Absolute Need 
 
When defining their needs, people are affected by their knowledge of 
what others have. What is considered a need in one part of the world 
might be classified as a want, a luxury, or even an extravagant 
overindulgence in another part of the world. Thus, it might be argued that 
a “need” is not an absolute but rather a relative concept. Accordingly, 
international justice might be thought of as requiring the satisfaction of 
only basic needs, and countries whose local definition of need is higher 
would be tasked with instituting internal redistribution. 
 90. TAMIR, supra note 9, at 117. 
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The relative need argument, attractive as it is, appeals to conceptions 
of inequality-based justice and not needs-based justice. The fact that 
others having more might make one dissatisfied with what one has is an 
argument for redistribution based upon inequality or, perhaps more 
precisely, perceptions of inequality. It does not, however, substantiate a 
contention that one who is faced with a higher standard of comparison is 
more needy than one who is not. In needs-based justice, alleviation of 
envy is not considered a need. Under a needs-based approach to justice, 
the “merely rich” do not have a claim of redistribution against the “super 
rich.” The fact that the standard of comparison established by the super 
rich may cause feelings of inadequacy, envy, and dissatisfaction among 
the merely rich is irrelevant. 
People’s tendency to compare their own standard of living with that 
of others around them is, in any case, a problematic justification for 
redistribution that would be required, not by the inequality per se, but by 
awareness of the inequality. Ignorance could, therefore, substitute for 
redistribution, and hiding the standard of living enjoyed by the wealthy 
would apparently satisfy claims of justice. Consider also what would 
happen if the lifestyles of the wealthy, despite their attempts to avoid 
exposure, were revealed to the less well-off public. Who would be 
responsible for the ensuing dissatisfaction: the wealthy, whose standard 
of living is the focus of the dissatisfaction, or those who brought it to the 
attention of the public at large?91
What others have, or the perception of what others have, cannot 
serve as basis for claims under needs-based justice. 
 
C.  Benefit Theory 
 
Benefit theory—the idea that the tax an individual pays should 
reflect the benefit he derives from public services—has served as an 
attempted justification for a redistributive tax structure.92 It is claimed 
that because one of the primary functions of government is the protection 
of wealth, the wealthy should bear the greatest share of the costs of 
providing those services. 
 91. I am assuming that the wealth referred to was acquired legitimately, so that, aside from 
establishing a basis for comparison, it is unobjectionable. By way of comparison, one who divulges 
that the wealth of an individual or of a class of individuals was acquired in violation of the norms of 
transactional or compensatory justice does not contribute in any way to the injustice; ignorance of 
injustice cannot serve as a remedy. A world in which victims of transactional or compensatory 
injustice are ignorant of the violation of their rights is not more just than a world in which they are 
aware of the facts. The situation described in the text is different. The claim being considered is that 
knowledge of the lifestyles of others is what creates the injustice. 
 92. EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, PROGRESSIVE TAXATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 190–202 
(2d ed. 1908). 
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Tax theory, however, has long recognized that relying on benefit 
theory to justify a progressive tax structure is problematic. It would 
require proof, not only that the rich receive greater benefit from 
government services, but also that the benefit increases at a greater rate 
than does their wealth. It is far from obvious that this is actually the case. 
John Stuart Mill, for example, contended that benefit theory would result 
in a regressive tax structure, with the weakest elements of society being 
the most dependent upon government protection.93
A related problem concerns financing assistance to the poor. Henry 
Simons, for example, argued that using benefit theory to allocate the cost 
of redistribution is a contradiction in terms.94 Financing transfer 
payments by charging the recipients would, of course, undermine the 
purpose of the exercise. Similarly, if the government were to establish 
soup kitchens to feed the poor and then charge each person who entered 
an amount equal to the benefit received, it would no longer be providing 
welfare services but simply operating a commercial diner. 
In effect, benefit theory is founded on the principle that anyone who 
benefits from government services without paying for them is unjustly 
enriched at the expense of his fellow taxpayers. Its goal is to prevent any 
disturbance of the pre-existing distribution. Benefit theory is, therefore, 
the antithesis of redistribution. 
Another benefit theory argument for redistribution is based on the 
contention that the true motive for redistribution is not concern for the 
welfare of the poor but, rather, a desire to protect the privileges of the 
wealthy.95 To enjoy their holdings, the wealthy require social stability, 
which could be threatened when vast disparities in wealth create wide-
scale dissatisfaction with the socio-economic structure. The rich thus 
have an interest in redistributing wealth to the extent necessary to keep 
discontent below the threshold of civil unrest.96
While the argument presented is not, perhaps, unfounded, it is 
 93. JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND CHAPTERS ON SOCIALISM 
156–57 (Jonathan Riley ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1994) (1848); see also SELIGMAN, supra note 92, at 
156–202 (indicating that benefit theory has been used to justify progressive, proportional and 
regressive taxation). 
 94. SIMONS, supra note 86, at 4. 
 95. FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE 
FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 20–21, 38 (2d ed. 1993) (1971). 
 96. But see JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT 73 (E.P Dutton & Co. 1951) (1861) (“[In accordance with some conceptions of 
benefit theory,] all should pay an equal capitation tax for the protection of their persons (these being 
of equal value to all), and an unequal tax for the protection of their property, which is unequal.”). 
Note also that very wealthy individuals often have the means to protect themselves and thus benefit 
less from redistribution than do members of the middle class, who are often the first victims of a 
breakdown of the social order. 
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nevertheless problematic. As already noted, benefit theory is 
fundamentally anti-redistribution. Only after all legitimate claims have 
been satisfied could benefit theory be called upon to prevent a disruption 
of what would now be a just distribution. Thus, in order to consider 
benefit theory, it must be assumed that all just claims to redistribution 
have already been satisfied. Given this assumption, the threat to disrupt 
the present distribution is inherently unjust. It is a threat to take by force 
the legitimate holdings of another. 
Paying another person not to use illegitimate force to threaten one’s 
holdings is the moral equivalent of succumbing to a protection racket. 
While yielding to the threat may be the most prudent course of action, a 
more principled response—and one which could prove more cost-
efficient in the long run—might be to defend oneself by allocating more 
resources to the protection of life, liberty, and property.97 Ostensibly it is 
those whose lives, liberty, and property are at risk who should bear the 
costs of the protection. Those who pose the threat gain no benefit from 
measures undertaken to defend against it. 
Nevertheless, the conclusion that only those who desire protection 
should pay for it is questionable, as it would seem to follow that 
criminals, deriving no benefit from law enforcement, would be relieved 
of the burden of paying for it through special tax breaks, a result which is 
patently absurd.98 In fact, compensatory justice would seem to demand 
the opposite result. Whereas criminals are the ones who create the 
necessity for law enforcement on the rest of society, they, more than 
anyone else, should pay for it. Similarly, if one group in society is 
illegitimately threatening the well-being of another, it would seem that 
the cost of defending against that threat should be borne by the former. 
Thus, applying this reasoning to the welfare benefits, the cost of 
maintaining the social order would apparently need to be paid for by the 
less well-off, who are ostensibly threatening the legitimate wealth of the 
rich. 
 
 
 
 
 
 97. WALDRON, supra note 19, at 265. 
 98. The question of whether the profits of criminal activity should be subject to taxation was, 
in the past, a subject of controversy. See James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961); Rutkin v. 
United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952); Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946), overruled in 
part by James, 366 U.S. 213. To the best of my knowledge, however, no one has ever raised the 
claim that criminals should be exempt from taxation because they derive no benefit from law 
enforcement. 
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While traditional attempts to ground redistribution on the benefits 
supposedly received by the wealthy from the existence of the state or 
from its protection of their fortunes are unconvincing, benefit theory 
should not be disparaged of in this context. It is possible to construct a 
benefit theory type of argument to justify a relatively extensive domestic 
redistribution. 
 
D.  Benefit Theory and Sentiment 
 
As discussed earlier, more concern is ordinarily shown for the fate of 
compatriots than for the fate of foreigners. The reason for this 
unbalanced concern might be found in humanity’s tribal origins and its 
primitive survival mechanisms. Whatever the cause, people do tend to 
care more about their compatriots than they do about foreigners and are 
ordinarily more willing to lend a hand when the well-being of their 
compatriots is concerned. 
Let us therefore assume that raising the welfare level of the less well-
off members of a given society—even if the needs of the worst-off have 
already been met—is something members of that society would tend to 
view favorably.99 Assume, in other words, that people would prefer to 
live in a society in which economic resources are distributed more fairly. 
In such a case, raising the welfare level of the less well-off and 
mitigating economic inequality would constitute a psychological benefit 
to the members of that society. By the terms of benefit theory, imposing 
a tax to finance the provision of that benefit is, therefore, wholly 
justified. 
Of course, one may question why it would be necessary to impose a 
tax in order to finance the redistribution if all members of the society 
concerned were interested in mitigating inequality beyond the strict 
requirements of justice. Why could the society not achieve the desired 
state of affairs through voluntary transfer payments? After all, when 
sentiment moves one to give gifts to family members or to friends, one 
simply does so; the impulse driving such sentiments does not need to be 
enforced by government action. 
However, relying on voluntary contributions to finance action, the 
benefits of which cannot reasonably be limited to contributors, raises 
issues of both efficiency and fairness. This Article has assumed that all 
members of the society concerned are interested in the mitigation of 
economic inequality beyond the dictates of distributive justice. 
Nevertheless, one would have no economic incentive to contribute, 
 99. In Part IV.E infra, I will consider what happens when this assumption is relaxed. 
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unless he were convinced that the redistribution would be fundamentally 
curtailed without his contribution. The psychological advantage of living 
in a more equal society accrues to all, whether or not they contribute to 
the redistribution.100 In a society as large as a modern country, where the 
impact of any single individual’s contribution is negligible, no one would 
have an economic incentive to contribute. Although the project might be 
economically efficient—in other words, the cost to each individual could 
be set at less that the psychological benefit that would accrue to him—
the inability to exclude free riders from enjoying the advantages of the 
redistribution would prevent what could have been a Pareto 
improvement.101 Even if it were possible to finance the project through 
voluntary contributions, it seems unfair to allow some to rely on the 
civic-mindedness of others and, despite not contributing to the cause, to 
enjoy the same benefits as those who did contribute. While a variety of 
reasonable formulae for imposing financial burdens may be proposed, it 
would appear that distribution of the burden in accordance with a 
person’s level of social consciousness is not among them. 
Redistribution beyond the supplying of needs can therefore be 
justified not in terms of distributive justice but, rather, in terms of 
transactional justice. The dictates of global distributive justice are 
satisfied when essential needs are met. In acting to promote the goal of 
redistribution beyond what is required by the dictates of justice, the 
government is providing a service that the market is incapable of doing 
efficiently. Imposing a tax to finance the redistribution is merely 
charging taxpayers for the psychological benefits accruing to them. 
Admittedly, no taxpayer contracted with the government to receive 
the service in exchange for a fee. Strictly speaking, then, there is no 
transaction and no place for transactional justice in the classic sense of 
the term. However, benefit theory steps in to fill in the gap. Where the 
market is incapable of operating efficiently, benefit theory holds that the 
government may provide the service and then charge each taxpayer 
according to the benefit he or she derived from that service. 102
Until now, this Article has assumed that all members of the society 
 100. Although we have assumed that everyone supports the goal of a more economically equal 
society, we may also assume, human nature being what it is, that most people would prefer that 
somebody else pay for it. 
 101. A Pareto improvement is a change which leaves at least one individual better off and 
leaves no one worse off: VILEFREDO PARETO, MANUEL D’ECONOMIE POLITIQUE 617–18 (1909), 
translated in T.W. HUTCHISON, A REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DOCTRINES, 1870–1929, at 225 (1953). 
 102. Cf. NOZICK, supra note 1, at 93–95 (Even if a person benefits from a service, he is not 
obliged to contribute toward its maintenance unless he agreed to do so. “One cannot, whatever one’s 
purposes, just act so as to give people benefits and then demand (or seize) payment. Nor can a group 
of persons do this.”). 
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in question are interested in redistribution beyond the dictates of 
distributive justice. Assume now that some individuals are indifferent to 
the issue of economic inequality and that mitigating inequality or 
improving the lot of the worst-off does not accord any psychological 
benefit to some members of the relevant society. These individuals could 
argue that because they derive no benefit from such activity, and because 
we are not dealing with alleviating needs, the government has no right, 
under the terms of either transactional or distributive justice, to require 
them to help pay for it. 
The real issue is one of quantifying the benefits each individual 
receives, and allowing that some members of society derive zero 
satisfaction is merely a limiting case. According to benefit theory, one 
who derives great pleasure from the service should pay a lot, one who 
benefits less should pay correspondingly less, and one who derives no 
benefit should not be called upon to contribute at all. However, 
quantifying benefits will often prove impossible in practice.103 For 
example, how much does any particular individual benefit from public 
parks?104 How much does any particular individual benefit from a parade 
down Main Street? How much does any particular individual benefit 
from knowing that the society of which he is a member is concerned with 
the welfare of the disadvantaged? There seems to be no realistic 
alternative to estimating, based on objective criteria, the extent to which 
individuals will benefit or have benefited from government-supplied 
services. 
Implementing benefit theory, whether with regard to national 
defense, environmental protection, or welfare assistance, necessarily 
involves a great deal of estimation, much of which is probably 
inaccurate. Nevertheless, unless one is willing to abandon benefit theory 
altogether, acting on conjecture is unavoidable. Therefore, where it 
seems reasonable to assume that most of those members of society who 
would be net givers under a proposed scheme of welfare assistance 
would derive psychological benefit from its implementation, benefit 
theory can be relied upon to justify the imposition of tax to             
 103. It may be difficult or impossible even to estimate the overall benefit to society. In many 
cases, therefore, we simply estimate the benefit, compare it to the cost, and proceed accordingly. The 
democratic political process may be viewed, in part, as an admittedly very crude way of estimating 
the benefits of proposed actions relative to their costs. The greater the number of people who favor a 
certain course of action, the more likely it may be that the benefits to be derived from that course of 
action exceed the cost. 
 104. I am not including here situations in which it is possible to fund the activity through user 
fees, such as by charging admission to public parks. I am referring to situations where it is 
unrealistic to charge for admittance or where even those who do not actually enter the park 
nevertheless benefit from its existence. 
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finance that assistance. 105
 
E. The Limits and Consequences of Benefit Theory Redistribution 
 
What happens when there is little or no interest in an economically 
more equal society? In other words, what happens when the cost of 
providing assistance beyond the level of need is greater than the total 
psychological benefit which comes from living in a society which takes 
better care of its worst-off members than is morally required? In the 
situation described, redistribution would be unjustified. Distributive 
justice has already been satisfied. Transactional justice would not permit 
the redistribution, since the price the government proposes charging the 
taxpayer for the service is presumed to be greater than the expected 
benefit. 
Redistribution is, of course, not an all or nothing affair. Willingness 
to fund up to but not beyond a certain level can be traced to the familiar 
convergence of two economic trends: diminishing marginal return and 
increasing marginal cost. From the perspective of the net donors, the 
psychological benefit of redistribution may be subject to the law of 
diminishing marginal utility because doubling the assistance given to the 
poor may not produce twice the amount of satisfaction for the net donors. 
Furthermore, taxes extracted to fund the redistribution are likely to 
impose an increasingly heavy burden on the taxpayer. At some point, the 
cost of funding the redistribution will equal and then outweigh the 
psychological benefit it brings. Until that point, benefit theory can 
provide the basis for a system of tax and transfer. Beyond that point, 
taxing for the purpose of redistribution is no longer legitimate. 
The extent of redistribution, determined by the caprice of society’s 
“haves,” may appear at first glance strange or even demeaning. Why 
should the distributive shares of society’s disadvantaged depend upon the 
generosity felt by their more affluent compatriots? Could it be that the 
obligations of redistribution will vary from society to society merely due 
 105. To forestall an objection that taking from those who genuinely oppose the policy would 
nevertheless be tantamount to theft, it might be helpful to phrase the argument in procedural terms. 
Consider the civil justice system. The possibility that the plaintiff will unjustly succeed is an 
accepted facet of the system. In ordinary cases, for example, all that is required to succeed is a 
preponderance of evidence. Nevertheless, lacking the omniscience necessary to determine who is 
entitled to what, we have no option but to rely on the available evidence, incomplete as it may be. 
Furthermore, the presentation of evidence may be barred when the cost or potential harm of doing so 
is significant enough. 
  Similarly, the principle that only those who support a policy should have to pay for it 
may be considered a substantive rule whose implementation is subject to procedural criteria. Where 
a good faith effort is made to determine people’s actual predilections, any inaccuracy may be 
regarded simply as a regrettable consequence of our lack of omniscience. 
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to the personal preferences of the wealthier among them? Would it not be 
more intellectually compelling to propose a rule delineating the extent of 
redistribution that members of a society would be morally obliged to 
follow, whatever the personal preferences of the wealthier among them? 
To be sure, there cannot exist an objective set of criteria for internal 
redistribution. For argument’s sake, assume that it were possible to 
formulate a rule for internal distribution that every society was bound to 
follow. The rule would specify the extent to which economic inequality 
would be subject to mitigation. It might adopt a strict Rawlsian approach 
that mandated, for example, that inequality should be mitigated to the 
extent that any further equalization would adversely affect the well-being 
of the least well-off. It might simply delineate the rate of taxation which 
should be imposed for the purpose of funding transfer payments and/or 
the provision of services to the less well-off. In any event, the same 
degree of inequality mitigation would almost certainly result in a greater 
absolute benefit to the less well-off in wealthier countries than in poorer 
countries. In other words, the primary beneficiaries of any “share the 
wealth” program would likely be those poor individuals who happen to 
live in rich countries. Similarly situated individuals living in poor 
countries would benefit less, simply because there would be less wealth 
to share. 
Nationality is, as discussed previously, an undeserved and morally 
arbitrary attribute which cannot substantiate a claim to distributive 
shares. Any such claim must be nationality-neutral. And yet, any rule 
providing for an internal sharing of the wealth would necessarily 
differentiate on the basis of nationality and apportion claims accordingly. 
Similarly situated individuals could fare very differently in different 
countries; one might be a net receiver of transfer payments while the 
other was a net donor, simply because one occupied a lower than average 
economic position in his country, while the other, with identical absolute 
wealth, occupied an above-average position in hers. As our previous 
discussions have shown, no rule of justice could dictate the allocation of 
distributive shares merely on the basis of nationality.106 Therefore, 
internal redistribution must be based not on any rule of justice, but upon 
feelings of national fraternity prevalent in that society. The level of 
justifiable redistribution would be dictated by the degree of fraternity. 
 106. This is not, of course, meant to imply that nationality could never be a factor in 
determining distributive shares. For instance, were geographical or political obstacles to prevent the 
rendering of assistance to residents of a particular country, refraining from rendering such assistance 
might not be unjust. Nevertheless, the nationality of the individuals who would otherwise be entitled 
to assistance is not the controlling factor. While it may be true that the objective obstacles may only 
apply to individuals of a particular nationality, justice condones the withholding of assistance, not 
because of the nationality, but because of those objective obstacles. 
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Predilections can, of course, change. People may sometimes be more 
willing to share their wealth than they are at other times, as evidenced in 
democratic countries by election results that indicate varying levels of 
sympathy for redistributive efforts. The degree of internal redistribution 
that a country institutes will likely fluctuate over time, reflecting public 
attitudes to the extent to which a society’s policymaking process 
incorporates those attitudes. Under the rules of distributive justice, such 
shifts cannot be considered normative. They can only be viewed as 
moving society closer to or farther away from some ideal distributive 
model.107 When society recognizes its moral obligations and acts 
accordingly, the institutions will approach the ideal.108 When distributive 
obligations are ignored due to ignorance, greed, or other factors, the gap 
between what institutions do and what they are supposed to do will 
widen. 
In accordance with needs-based justice, both national and 
international institutions are required to operate so as to satisfy needs 
where doing so is not prohibitively risky or expensive. A society acts 
illegitimately if it does not establish the institutions necessary to satisfy 
its obligations towards either its own needy members or towards 
foreigners, regardless of whether the failure to do so is a result of 
ignorance of its obligations or because of an unwillingness, for whatever 
reason, to fulfill them. Whatever its procedures for determining how it 
acts, it has no more right to decide to refrain from fulfilling those 
obligations than it has the right to decide to take by force wealth which 
legitimately belongs to others. 
However, once obligations of distributive justice have been satisfied 
and further redistribution proceeds under the jurisdiction of benefit 
theory, there is nothing anomalous about the adaptation of institutions to 
the prevailing political opinions. In fact, ignoring the change in attitude 
and continuing on with a program which was formerly appropriate might 
no longer be legitimate. What is normatively required is not a particular 
set of institutions or even a particular degree of redistribution, but rather 
the adaptation of institutions to people’s attitudes toward redistribution. 
An important distinction between redistribution based upon 
principles of distributive justice and redistribution based upon principles 
 107. I am not referring here to adaptations of a given model to changing circumstances. 
Having adopted a particular distributive model, a country may find that changes in overall wealth or 
in wealth distribution require, for example, a modification of tax rates to obtain the same results 
which the previous tax rates had formerly been able to achieve. What I am concerned with, in other 
words, is the phenomenon of shifting goals which a society sets for itself, not the adaptation of the 
means by which it achieves those goals. 
 108. One of the functions of the social philosopher, on this view, is to show people what their 
moral obligations are in the field of distributive justice. 
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of benefit theory may be the extent to which the granting of benefits to 
the less well-off may be conditional. Where justice requires a 
redistribution, the ability of those in possession of the wealth to impose 
conditions on its redistribution is restricted; they can no more impose 
restrictions on the redistribution of wealth in their possession than can 
the possessor of lost or stolen property place conditions on the property’s 
return to its rightful owner. Redistribution undertaken based upon the 
terms of benefit theory is different, in that the extent of justifying 
redistribution is a function of society’s willingness to assist its least well-
off persons. It may, therefore, impose conditions on the granting of that 
assistance. 
However, conditions may be imposed in practice, even when 
assistance is granted within the context of needs-based justice. Provided 
that the condition is reasonable, one who refuses to satisfy the condition 
would no longer meet the criteria of neediness. Assume, for example, 
that aid to the needy is conditional upon their entering a job training 
program or undergoing treatment for whatever condition is responsible 
for creating or perpetuating their state of neediness. Provided that the 
condition to receiving assistance is reasonable, its imposition would not 
violate the distributive obligations of those who are in a position to help. 
As previously mentioned, anyone who is presently capable of supplying 
his own needs should not be classified as needy. As long as the 
opportunity remained available and the conditions remained reasonable, 
there would be no duty to assist those who, due to an unwillingness to 
meet the conditions, declined the proffered assistance. 
 
F.  Benefit Theory, Distributive Justice, and the Terms of Public Debate 
 
Would debates over public policy be affected by viewing the 
question of redistribution as one to be discussed under the terms of 
benefit theory as opposed to under the terms of distributive justice? One 
might argue that the effect would be minimal. As a practical matter, each 
participant in the public policy debate attempts to convince her audience 
that the views she espouses are preferable to the alternatives. The 
political process then judges the effectiveness of the arguments raised on 
all sides and adopts an appropriate position. The procedure appears to be 
similar whether the arguments are based upon criteria of distributive 
justice or benefit theory. Nevertheless, there would be significant 
differences between the two. 
Where the debate is held under the terms of distributive justice, each 
participant argues that his position is the correct one and is mandated by 
considerations of justice. The attitude of his audience is inconsequential 
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for the purpose of determining the moral value of his arguments. If his 
arguments are correct, then justice requires their adoption. A proponent 
of the difference principle, for example, would presumably argue that the 
only just course of action for society to take is to establish institutions 
which implement that principle. The fact that the vast majority of society 
might reject the Rawlsian model would in no way affect the fact that it is 
morally required. The job of the would-be molder of public opinion is 
simply to convince his audience of society’s moral obligation. The 
audience, in fact, is only important for procedural reasons. It is only 
because they hold the key to implementing the proposed model that they 
need to be convinced. 
Furthermore, members of the target audience need not be convinced 
that they are happy with the proposed redistribution scheme. It is enough 
that they feel it to be their obligation. For example, there is nothing 
anomalous about a person responding to a justice-based argument by 
saying, “I do not like the idea of sharing so much of my hard-earned 
wealth with others, and I wish that I did not have to do so, but it appears 
to be my moral duty.” 
When, on the other hand, the debate over public policy is held within 
the framework of benefit theory, the target audience plays a substantive, 
rather than merely a procedural role in shaping social institutions, as 
public opinion determines not just what will most likely happen, but 
what ought to happen. The justification, under benefit theory, for 
instituting a more extensive redistribution than is required by the dictates 
of distributive justice is that by providing transfer payments to the less 
well-off, the government provides a service to those who prefer living in 
a more economically equal society. The government is therefore justified 
in redistributing wealth to the extent and only to the extent necessary to 
satisfy that preference. 
When the mood of the public changes, the degree of redistribution 
that is justifiable will also change. For example, when members of the 
public are less interested in redistribution than they were previously, the 
government would not be entitled to continue charging them for a service 
which they were no longer interested in receiving. Redistribution would 
need to be scaled back, although the minimum level of redistribution 
necessary to satisfy the demands of distributive justice would, of course, 
have to be maintained in any case. When, on the other hand, public 
support for redistribution increases, a course of action which may not 
have been legitimate in the past might become justified. 
Thus, convincing the target audience of the need for a more 
extensive redistribution, for example, is not a means to a just result under 
the benefit theory. Without the public’s support, a more extensive 
  
267] A THEORY OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 321 
 
redistribution is not just politically impossible, it is actually unjust. 
Convincing others to share one’s personal preferences could therefore 
affect not just what the government will do, but what it ought to do.109
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
The international arena must be considered when testing proposed 
principles of distributive justice. If applying those principles in the 
international context conflicts with one’s considered judgments 
regarding moral duty, the conflict might indicate a need to rethink the 
principles. Furthermore, an examination of considered judgments 
regarding moral duty in the international context might show them to be 
relevant for the domestic arena as well. 
Many social philosophers signal their discomfort with the 
international implications of the principles they espouse simply by 
ignoring the international arena. Recently, however, scholars have begun 
to examine the international implications of principles that have been 
developed domestically. While some are willing to apply those principles 
globally, most who consider the issue are hesitant to do so and have 
 109. In order to highlight the differences between public policy debates in the framework of 
distributive justice as opposed to those held in the framework of benefit theory, consider the 
implications of circumventing public opinion and attempting to influence decision-making by a 
direct appeal to those with actual decision-making power. Where issues of distributive justice are 
concerned, such an appeal would, ostensibly, be justified. The fact that the decision does not 
conform to what the public wants is irrelevant, as the decision conforms to what the public is 
morally required to do. Where, on the other hand, the issue is one of benefit theory, convincing the 
public is necessary in order to justify the implementation of one’s own predilections. 
  The approach suggested here may be helpful, for example, in formulating the principles 
concerning the appropriate role of the judiciary in matters of fiscal policy. The courts, on this view, 
may be a legitimate venue for addressing issues of distributive justice. Distributive justice, after all, 
addresses the fundamental question of what belongs to whom, and what belongs to whom is a 
question which courts routinely address. 
  When a dispute arises as to property rights, the substantive issue before the court is not 
usually the question of who presently possesses the property, but rather who is entitled to possession. 
An argument that the court’s function must be limited to determining who is in actual physical 
possession and that opining on who is entitled to possession is beyond the court’s mandate would, of 
course, be summarily rejected. The job of the court is to determine the right of possession, and if the 
party with the right to possess the property is not the party in actual possession, to act so as to rectify 
the situation. Their ruling on issues of distributive justice would be no more an overstepping of the 
bounds of their authority than are their rulings on issues of transactional, compensatory, or punitive 
justice. 
  Beyond the strict requirements of distributive justice, however, a court would have no 
authority to determine the proper distribution of wealth in society. Whether or not the society in 
question desires to go beyond the requirements of distributive justice and institute a more extensive 
redistribution of resources is an issue for the members of that society, acting through the political 
process, to determine. 
  This brief note does not, of course, constitute a complete analysis of the role the courts 
should play, and of their relationship vis-à-vis the legislature, in formulating social policy. 
Nevertheless, it may be helpful in considering what that role should be. 
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therefore sought out justifications to avoid extensive international 
redistribution. 
Rawls contended that morally arbitrary factors are inappropriate 
criteria by which to determine distributive shares.110 Those who are less 
favored by nature, he claimed, have an equal moral claim to primary 
goods, the only justification for unequal distribution of resources being 
economic efficiency.111 Yet, if morally arbitrary factors are indeed 
inappropriate criteria by which to determine distributive shares, it would 
seem to follow that allowing nationality to determine who is entitled to 
what is problematic. 
If justice requires a Rawlsian redistribution, it must demand that the 
same principles be applied to all, without regard to race, religion, gender, 
caste, natural talents, social position, or nationality. If, on the other hand, 
nationality is a legitimate factor in determining distributive shares, it is 
unclear why other, equally arbitrary characteristics could not be 
legitimate factors also. The former premise leads to cosmopolitanism and 
the latter leads to libertarianism. Capturing the middle ground between 
cosmopolitanism and libertarianism requires adopting a position that 
recognizes, on the one hand, that morally arbitrary factors do in fact 
determine distributive shares and does not impose upon human society 
the obligation to neutralize the effects of those factors, and yet, on the 
other hand, does not dismiss redistribution as an essential element of 
distributive justice. 
Needs-based justice does not impose any duty to mitigate economic 
inequality per se.112 It does, however, require the proffering of assistance 
to those in need when the cost and risk involved in doing so are not 
prohibitive. However, when organizing its internal affairs, a state may, in 
certain circumstances, go beyond the strict requirements of distributive 
justice. Where members of the society are interested in a more extensive 
internal redistribution, the state may provide some of the wants of the 
less well-off members and charge the others for the service provided. 
The extent of redistribution permissible under such a scheme would be 
established not by any philosophically determinable formula, but rather 
by the actual predilections of the particular society concerned at any 
given moment in time. 
 
 110. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 72–75. 
 111. Id. at 151. 
 112. Rawls’s own conception of international obligations strongly resembles needs-based 
justice. See RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 9, at 117. 
